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Valuing our Discordant Constitutional
Discourse: Autonomous-Text
Constitutionalism and the Jewish Legal
Tradition
SHLOMO C. PILL†
INTRODUCTION
Constitutional interpretation is a central concern of the
American legal system. American law is, at its core,
constitutional law, and the meaning of the United States
Constitution bears in some way on virtually every legal issue,
substantive and procedural. But understanding the
Constitution is not easy; for a number of reasons—the
centrality of the Constitution as the sacred-text of our civil
religion, the Constitution’s often vague and ambiguous
language, the contradictory enforcement of a democratic
constitution through the undemocratic process of judicial
review—deciding what the text means and how we ought to
determine what the text means constitute one of the most
contentious spheres of American public life.1 American
constitutionalism prides itself as being the enlightened rule
of law, the primacy of right reason over selfish will,2 but the
increasingly caustic tone of our constitutional disagreement
threatens to collapse the distinction, making ours a rule of
men.
This devolution of legal argument into political
disagreement finds potent expression in the debate over
interpretive theory, over the how of constitutional
† S.J.D. candidate in Law and Religion, 2016, Center for the Study of Law and
Religion, Emory Law School; L.L.M., 2013, Center for the Study of Law and
Religion, Emory Law School; J.D., 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A.,
2009, Political Science and History, Lander College for Men.
1. See Hillary Salans, More Harm than Good?, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1035
(1987) (book review) (“The debate over constitutional interpretation becomes
more heated when one asks how the Supreme Court should interpret the vague
meaning of the Constitution’s text.”).
2. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 7-30 (1999).
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interpretation. Disagreements about the proper way to
interpret the Constitution are driven in part by interpretive
theorists’ varied perspectives on how best to resolve some of
the central problems of American constitutional theory,
which manifest particularly in the interpretive context.3
Competing visions of how to deal with the dead hand
problem, the counter-majoritarian difficulty, and the
competing needs for pragmatism and continuity translate
into a fierce debate over proper methods of interpretation
with each side accusing the other of subjectivity, judicial
activism, and making rather than applying the law.
Autonomous-textualism, an interpretive theory inspired
by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, holds
the promise of elevating our constitutional debate above the
partisan political fray. This theory posits that textual truth
is pluralistic, and that the meaning of the Constitution lies
in the epistemological product of an interpretive dialectic
between the constitutional text and each individual reader.4
While the idea of interpretive pluralism bears the foreboding
tidings of constitutional anarchy, Jewish law’s threethousand year old constitutional tradition offers a powerful
model for how autonomous-textualism might work in
practice. Interpretation in Jewish law closely resembles the
Gadamerian model, and has been used to successfully apply
Jewish law across time and space in a pragmatic way that
preserves the historical continuity of the Jewish legal
tradition.5 Relying on interpretive pluralism, Jewish law has
dealt effectively with the constitutional dilemmas that drive
America’s harsh interpretive debate, and thus offers a way of
elevating our discordant constitutional discourse by
embracing
autonomous-textualism’s
epistemologically
pluralistic vision.6
Part I of this Article begins by discussing three principle
approaches common to contemporary American interpretive
theory, and then explains the autonomous-textualism
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See infra Part II; cf. AARON M. SCHREIBER, JEWISH LAW
MAKING: A STUDY THROUGH TIME 7 (1979).
6. See infra Part III.
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alternative inspired by Gadamer’s hermeneutical work. Part
II turns to legal interpretation in the Jewish legal tradition,
first explaining the constitutional foundations of the Jewish
legal system, next exploring the autonomous-text in Jewish
law interpretive theory, and finally discussing how Jewish
law deals with interpretive pluralism in legal practice. Part
III concludes by briefly discussing how Jewish law addresses
some of the central problems of constitutionalism that
animate the contemporary debate over interpretation, and by
suggesting how Jewish law’s resolutions for these problems
might make autonomous-textualism a desirable interpretive
paradigm for American constitutional discourse.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, HERMENEUTICS, AND
THE AUTONOMOUS TEXT
Hermeneutics generally, and textual hermeneutics in
particular, is concerned with providing an account of the
relationship between a standardized object and a shifting
context.7 Scholars consider the nature of this object-subject
relationship and the manner in which factors like authorial
intent, the objectivity of language, historical context, and
interpretive subjectivity relate to the structuring of this
relationship in the quest for textual understanding. As
applied to constitutional jurisprudence, the hermeneutics of
legal interpretation works to explain the relationship
between the text of the Constitution and the circumstances
under which constitutional interpretation takes place. Thus,
constitutional hermeneutics focuses on relations between a
fixed constitutional text and the interpretive application of
that text to a particular factual circumstance, the case.8
Scholars of constitutional interpretation thus consider how
various hermeneutical, jurisprudential, and political
intent,
precedent,
judiciousness,
values—language,
majoritiarianism, and rights, to name a few—factor into the
hermeneutical equation, the constitutional interpretive
enterprise.

7. See Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the
Autonomous Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1068-69 (1993).
8. See id. at 1068-69.
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This Part explores the field of contemporary
constitutional hermeneutics. Part I.A briefly reviews the
principle hermeneutical typologies—textualism, historicism,
and pragmatism—that have come to dominate the
interpretive field. Part I.B turns to explicate an alternative
interpretive
paradigm—autonomous-textualism—that
derives
from
Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s
innovative
philosophical hermeneutics.
A. The Interpretive Orthodoxy
This Section briefly summarizes the goals, justifications,
and principle critiques of the three dominant theories of
constitutional
interpretation.
Part
I.A.1
discusses
textualism, which maintains that legal texts ought to be
interpreted and given meaning in light of the plain meaning
of their language gleaned through the use of dictionary
definitions, rules of grammar and syntax, and accepted
canons of legal interpretations. Part I.A.2 turns to
historicism, which sites the meaning of legal texts in some
point in time, usually the time of a law’s enactment.
Historical interpreters may look variously at the “original
intent” or “original meaning” of a law, and understand
textual meaning to lie in some sense with the intentions of
those who brought a particular text into being. Finally, Part
I.A.3 examines pragmatic interpretation, which contends
that the meaning of a legal text, a statute or a constitution,
should be determined in light of any number of contemporary
policy objectives, whether economic utility, racial equality, or
majoritarian decision-making.
1. Textualism
Textualist theories of interpretation claim normative
support in several general concepts of legal and political
theory. Textualists contend that laws must be interpreted
and understood in terms of their plain textual meaning
because only the text of the law—and its apparent linguistic
meaning—were enacted into law by a legislating authority.9
9. See James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New
Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1539 (2011).
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As Justice Scalia points out, “[t]he text is the law, and it is
the text that must be observed.”10 On this view, textualism is
required as a function of the law’s democratic legitimacy. If
laws are normatively binding because they embody the
majoritarian decisions of the demos or their representatives,
then it is only the text law enacted by such legislative bodies
that can claim such democratic pedigree.11 Other conceptions
of what the law means lack such normative legitimacy:
Interpretations based on authorial intent derived from
legislative history are not truly indicative of the majority’s
will, merely reflecting the subjective hopes of individual
lawmakers.12 Similarly, textual understandings grounded in
pragmatic policy concerns do not hearken to the democratic
roots of the text at all; they reflect the political preferences of
individual contemporary interpreters.13 Moreover, textualists
claim that their formalistic approach to legal interpretation
is needed to preserve the democratic character of legal rules
from the machinations of subjective, unconstrained, and
unelected judicial interpreters.14
Critics of textualist interpretation level a number of
principle arguments against this formalistic interpretive
methodology. Some non-textualists contend that textualism
falls prey to what it sees as most damning in other
interpretive approaches: judicial subjectivity. These critics
argue that words have many reasonable usages, that
reference to the structure and syntax of legal texts is usually
indeterminate, and that even the cannons of interpretation
must themselves be interpreted before they can be applied.15
Consequently, textualism too involves a high degree of
inevitably subjective judgment to decide which among any

10. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 22 (1997).
11. Id. at 21-23.
12. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
403-05 (3d ed. 2003).
13. See id. at 415-17.
14. See SCALIA, supra note 10, at 25.
15. See Campos, supra note 7, at 1069-70.
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number of plain meanings should control.16 Another
important criticism of textual interpretation argues that
textualism’s overly formalistic methodology and lack of
regard for results is simply unworkable in the real world,
where interpreters have to live with the consequences of their
abstract textual constructions.17
2. Historicism
The historical method of constitutional interpretation
finds constitutional meaning not in the text itself, but in a
particular historically-grounded conception of what that text
means. For some historicists, the subjective intentions of the
Framers of the Constitution are the principle source of
constitutional meaning;18 for others the understandings of
the Constitution’s Framers or Ratifiers are binding;19 still
others focus on what a reasonable person of the founding era
would have likely understood the Constitution to mean.20
Historicists, in other words, argue that the Constitution is
legally binding because of a particular historical event, and
it is therefore an understanding of the text inextricably
16. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 12, at 390-95.
17. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
125-28 (1994); Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 422-23 (1989).
18. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem—The Role of
the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REV. 811, 811-12
(1983) (“[J]udges should be guided by the intent of the Framers of the relevant
constitutional provisions.”).
19. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (“The search is not for a subjective intention.
If someone found a letter from George Washington to Martha telling her that
what he meant by the power to lay taxes was not what other people meant, that
would not change our reading of the Constitution in the slightest. Nor would the
subjective intentions of all the members of a ratifying convention alter anything.
When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what those words ordinarily
mean.”).
20. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV.
327, 398 (2002) (defining historicism as “a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a
fully informed public audience, knowing all that there is to know about the
Constitution and the surrounding world, would understand a particular
provision”).
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bound up with that event that is controlling. As Attorney
General Meese put it in his famous articulation of originalist
interpretation, “only ‘the sense in which the Constitution was
accepted and ratified by the nation,’ and only the sense in
which laws were drafted and passed provide a solid
foundation for adjudication.”21
Like textualism, historicism is driven chiefly by a desire
to preserve the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution and
statutes, and it is used to interpret and to constrain the
discretion of unelected judges interpreting and applying legal
texts.22 For historicists, the Constitution gets its authority
from the supermajoritarian decision of 1789 Americans to
ratify the document proposed by the Philadelphia
Convention. Consequently, the Constitution must be
understood to mean what those who enacted it thought it to
mean.23 Moreover, historicists claim that pragmatic and
textualist methodologies are inherently malleable and
subjective, and that only a search for historical
understandings offers an objective, neutral standard for
constitutional interpretation.24 Indeed, for many historical
interpreters, the choice of methodology is simply one between
the constrained and objective approach offered by

21. Edwin Meese, III, Attorney General, Speech Before the American Bar
Association (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 1, 10 (Paul G. Cassell ed., 1986).
22. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713,
714 (2011) (“Originalism was born of a desire to constrain judges.”).
23. See Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of
a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465 (1986) (“The Constitution
represents the consent of the governed to the structures and powers of the
government. The Constitution is the fundamental will of the people; that is the
reason the Constitution is the fundamental law. To allow the courts to govern
simply by what it views at the time as fair and decent, is a scheme of government
no longer popular; the idea of democracy has suffered.”); see also JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 5-8 (1980).
24. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
864 (1989) (“Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system,
for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the
preferences of the judge himself.”).
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originalism, and the undemocratic judicial subjectivity and
activism threatened by any other interpretive theory.25
Historicism has been subject to withering critique,
particularly since its resurgence in the legal academy and
judiciary over the past thirty years.26 Justice Brennan for
example, referring to originalists’ claim that historical
interpretation avoids the problem of judicial subjectivity and
pointing to the inherent indeterminacy of all interpretation,
called originalist methodology “little more than arrogance
cloaked as humility.”27 This critique stems from a belief that
the real historical meaning of a legal text is ultimately
unknowable.
As an
empirical
matter,
historical
interpretation cannot really recover the original intent or
understanding of a legal text because “the whole concept of
‘intent’ is meaningless when considering a large legislative
body.”28 Also, even if some collective intent or understanding
could be known, available materials paint an incomplete
picture of the whole. Moreover, even if the raw materials for
historical interpretation were adequate, the contemporary
interpreter’s impression of the original intent or

25. See Robert Bork, The Struggle Over the Role of the Court, NAT’L REV., Sept.
17, 1982, at 1137-38 (“The truth is that the judge who looks outside the [original
understanding of the] Constitution always looks inside himself and nowhere
else.”); see also DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE
DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 173-75 (2005).
26. For an excellent summary of the various empirical and normative critiques
of originalism, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
27. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech Before the Text and Teaching
Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE, supra
note 21, at 11, 14; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing it is “dangerous to assume that, even with
the utmost self-discipline, judges can prevent the implications they see from
mirroring the policies they favor” when relying on legislative history).
28. Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective Cannons of Statutory
Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and
Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 536 (1997-1998) (footnote
omitted); see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986); Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 213-17
(1980).
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understanding would inevitably be colored by being situated
in the present.29
3. Pragmatism
The pragmatist approach to constitutional interpretation
includes many diverse interpretive theories that contend the
Constitution should be understood in light of any number of
policy objectives,30 such as economic utility,31 majoritarian
processes,32 or contemporary morality.33 “The common trait
among them is that they ultimately conclude that the
judiciary should act as a pragmatic policymaker.”34 For
pragmatists, therefore, the key interpretive question is not
what the words mean—critiques of textualism and
historicism demonstrate that textual meaning is ultimately
indeterminate.35 Instead, pragmatist interpreters focus on
“how we ought to interpret [the text] in trying to approximate
[its] true meaning or the best interpretation.”36 Pragmatists
interpret the text of the Constitution in light of deeply held
national and constitutional values, understanding the
content of protections like “due process of law,”37 “cruel and

29. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 10, at 65, 72.
30. See Richard Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1653, 1656-57 (1990).
31. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY (1999).
OF

32. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 23.
33. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreward: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9, 11 (1979).
34. Keith E. Whittington, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 32 (1999).

TEXTUAL

35. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
36. SOTORIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING,
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 155 (2007).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.

CONSTITUTIONAL
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unusual punishment,”38 and “equal protection of the laws”39
as a function of policies furthering those values.40
Interpretive pragmatism rests on several jurisprudential
premises. As Judge Posner explains,
[t]he first [premise] is a distrust of metaphysical entities “reality,”
“truth,” “nature,” etc.[,] viewed as warrants for certitude whether
in epistemology, ethics, or politics. The second is an insistence that
propositions be tested by their consequences, by the difference they
make [in terms of whatever pragmatic criteria an interpreter
favors] . . . . The third is an insistence on judging our projects,
whether scientific, ethical, political, or legal, by their conformity to
social or other human needs rather than to “objective,”
“impersonal” criteria.41

As the critiques of the textual and historical approaches
indicate, there is ample reason to be skeptical of the notion
that interpretation can ever yield an objective textual
understanding; “any interpretive method necessarily reflects
the embrace of some substantive values.”42 If all interpretive
understandings of legal texts make substantive judgment,
then, it makes sense to choose the understanding that
maximizes important substantive values.43 Pragmatic
interpretation makes further sense in light of the reality that
laws are instituted to serve social policy aims, and they
should therefore be interpreted and applied to further those
substantive objectives.44 Understandably then, the success of
any interpretation turns on how well it furthers the values
that drive the interpretive process.45

38. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 70-78 (3d ed.
2000). See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
41. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, in PRAGMATISM
29, 35-36 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).

IN LAW AND SOCIETY

42. TRIBE, supra note 40, at 71.
43. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1331, 1342 (1988).
44. See Posner, supra note 30.
45. See Farber, supra note 43, at 1343.
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Several principle arguments are advanced against
pragmatism as an interpretive methodology. The most
common criticism of pragmatic interpretation is that it is
unprincipled, that it allows legal interpreters to determine
textual meaning on an ad hoc subjective basis.46 More
problematic, pragmatism enables unauthorized judicial
activism. As Ronald Dworkin explains, “[a]n activist justice
would ignore the Constitution’s text, the history of its
enactment, prior decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting
it, and long-standing traditions of our political culture . . . in
order to impose on other branches of government his own
view of what justice demands.”47 Another criticism of
pragmatist interpretation, offered by Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
contends that by encouraging judges to interpret and apply
the Constitution to further substantive ends, pragmatists
denigrate “values associated with the rule of law” like
democracy and individual rights.48 Even pragmatists who
champion majoritarian processes as the prime standard of
interpretive textual meaning undermine democratic
decision-making through their result oriented rulings not
sanctioned or controlled by majoritarian institutions.
Pragmatism also undermines the significance of legal and
constitutional rights because for the pragmatist interpreter,
like the legal realist, a legal right exists only because the
judge decides that its existence will further some other
substantive end. The right itself thus becomes a mere
instrument, a means to a greater political end.49
B. Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics and
Autonomous-Text Constitutionalism
The traditional hermeneutics of textualism, historicism,
and pragmatism does not exhaust the interpretive field. A
fourth methodology, which I call here “autonomoustextualism” offers a powerful alternative to the interpretive
46. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger
Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1455 (1987).
47. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 378 (1986).
48. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L.
REV. 535, 573-74 (1999).
49. See id.
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orthodoxy. Autonomous-textualism posits that once enacted,
the binding text of the Constitution became unmoored from
any particular conceptions of what the text means, that
constitutional interpretation is a dialectical interaction
between text and interpreter, and that textual meaning is an
evolving concept rather than a fixed object of interpretation.
Autonomous-text constitutionalism derives principally
from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics,
which in turn relies on a unique epistemological conception
of textual understanding and a powerful critique of the other
interpretive methodologies’ abilities to produce true textual
understanding. According to Gadamer, all interpretation—
indeed, all understanding—is ontological; we understand
things as “part of the total human experience of the world.”50
We try to understand and make sense of everything around
us, and we do so through interpreting those things;
constitutions, novels, television shows, billboard ads, and
conversations with the mailman—we interpret these things
and give them meaning based on our own prior experience of
the world. An interpreter thus approaches a text with
inevitable prejudices—his experiential consciousness, what
Gadamer calls his “horizon of understanding”51—and
interprets the text through that subjective lens.
Interpretation does not consist merely of the interpreter
imposing his subjective perspective on the text, however,
because as he interprets the text it becomes part of his
experiential horizon, further influencing the way in which he
understands the text.52 For Gadamer, therefore,
interpretation, the process of arriving at textual
understanding, is a cyclical dialectic: The interpreter
approaches and begins to read and understand the text
through the lens of his subjective horizon, but that initial
understanding immediately integrates itself into the
interpreter’s experiential lens, and this new, broader horizon
in turn continues to color and refine his understanding of the
50. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD xi (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1989).
51. GADAMER, supra note 50, at 143.
52. See Frank S. Ravitch, Interpreting
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377, 381-83.

Scripture/Interpreting

Law,
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interpreted object.53 As Gadamer puts it, “the anticipated
meaning of a whole [text] is understood through the parts,
but it is in light of the whole that the parts take on their
illuminating function.”54
Building on this epistemology, Gadamer views texts, the
objects of interpretation, as essentially autonomous, released
from any particular meaning attributed to them through
textual, historical, or pragmatic interpretive methodologies.
Once set down in writing, a text “has detached itself from the
contingency of its origin and its author and made itself free
for new relationships.”55 On this view, “[t]he text is what it is,
no matter what meaning is assigned to it by its author and
no matter how that meaning is revised by its readers.”56
Gadamer’s conception of interpretive understanding
condemns the formalistic methodology of textualism.
Textualists claim that the true meaning of a text lies in the
plain meaning of the text itself, and is derived by applying
formal rules and canons of interpretation to the language,
structure, and form of a text. On this view, a text and its
meaning is an object distinct from its interpreter; the
interpreter uses textualist methods to discover the meaning
that inheres in the text. For Gadamer, however, a textual
meaning is not a thing distinct from the interpreter capable
of being unearthed by using the right interpretive method.57
Instead, textual understanding is a product of a dialectic
interaction between a text and its interpreter; it is the result
of a “merging of horizons,”58 and is thus part of the
interpreter’s experiential consciousness as much as it is part
53. See Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in
Jurisprudence, 76 IOWA L. REV. 661, 684-90 (1991).
54. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Problem of Historical Consciousness, in
INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE 103, 146 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan
eds., 1979).
55. GADAMER, supra note 50, at 357.
56. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, The Impossibility of Intentionless
Meaning, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION 51, 57 (Gary Iseminger ed., 1992).
57. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM
POSTMODERNISM 31-33 (2000) (“Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics
maintains that . . . no uninterpreted or foundational source of meaning stands
outside of or prior to interpretation.”).
TO

58. DERMOT MORAN, INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 252-53 (2000).
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of the interpreted text. On this view, there is no objective
understanding or plain meaning of a text. The way a text is
understood, what a text means, depends on who is reading it;
every interpreter understands the text through the lens of his
own horizon, and his honest, good-faith interpretation of that
text is therefore as unique as his own experiential
consciousness.
Even if texts had an objective meaning, however, even if
textual understanding was something to be discovered and
not an evolutionary experience unique to every interpreter,
on Gadamer’s view textualist methodologies would still fail
to uncover this true textual meaning. Because he views
understanding as ontological, a product of a merging of
horizons between the subject interpreter and object text,
“[o]ne of Gadamer’s central arguments . . . is that any inquiry
or investigation believed to be without prejudice or bias is in
denial of its own conditioned ways of understanding.”59 The
textual understanding derived through any particular
interpretive methodology thus cannot be the “true” meaning
of the interpreted text. Instead, it is the interpreter’s
subjective conception of what the text means, a product of an
interaction between the interpreter’s experiential self, the
text, and the methodology, which itself is applied only after
it is understood by the interpreter through the subjective lens
of his own epistemological horizon. Thus, even the
hermeneutical product of textualist interpretive methods is
not—cannot be—a simple reflection of the objective plain
meaning of the text.60
Gadamer’s hermeneutics similarly rejects historicism as
an interpretive methodology accurately reflective of a text’s
meaning. Historicists maintain that we uncover the meaning
of a text by reconstructing the text as an historical
phenomenon in terms of the authorial intent or
59. STANLEY E. PORTER & JASON C. ROBINSON, HERMENEUTICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERPRETIVE THEORY 85 (2011).
60. See id. at 86 (“Understanding happens through a gradual and perpetual
interplay between the subject matter and the interpreter’s initial position — a
fusion of one’s own horizon and the horizon of the text or other. Within this fusion,
Gadamer denies the possibility of any single and objectively true interpretation
that could transcend all viewpoints . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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understanding, or in terms of some objective meaning
attributed to the text at some historically significant point in
time.61 However, like textualism, historicism fails because in
Gadamer’s conception of understanding a reliance on any
methodology of interpretation misunderstands the nature of
interpretation and textual understanding as an interactive
dialectic between text and interpreter.62 Interpretation is
inextricably linked with the interpreter’s ‘“being’ in the
world,”63 and therefore his “perception is never a simple
reflection of what is presented to the senses.”64 Even if
historical interpretive methodology seeks to discover the
authorial intent or understanding of a text, after an
interpreter
applies
this
approach,
“[w]hat
is
65
reconstructed . . . is not the original.” Instead, an historical
interpreter uncovers his own subjective perception of what
the author intended or understood, filtered as all
interpretation is through the interpreter’s experiential
horizon.66
Historicism also fails on a normative level. “For
Gadamer, the meaning of a literary work is never exhausted
by the intentions of its author; as the work passes from one
cultural or historical context to another, new meanings may
be culled from it which were perhaps never anticipated by its
author.”67 The meaning of a text is simply not what the
61. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 682 (1991) (“What is
authoritative, for sophisticated originalism, is the principle (or principles) the
ratifiers understood themselves to be establishing. (More precisely, what is
authoritative is the principle that the enfranchised public understood, or would
have understood, the ratifiers to be establishing.)”).
62. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
63. Isaak Dore, Pragmatic Existentialism in a Post-Newtonian World, 54 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1277, 1291 (2010).
64. GADAMER, supra note 50, at 90.
65. Id. at 167.
66. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 620-23 (1990) (“[I]nterpretation as re-creation-of-the-past is
not only impracticable, it is an impoverished view of the activity.”); see also
Campos, supra note 7, at 1072.
67. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 61-62 (Anniversary
ed., Blackwell Publishing 2008).
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author of the text intended it to mean or what he or others of
his or another time understood it to mean. The meaning of a
text is an amorphous thing; it is the product of Gadamer’s
dialectic interaction between text and interpreter, and it
therefore changes from one reader to the next, and within the
conscious of one interpreter from one reading to the next.
Textual meaning literally “comes into being” every time a
text is read.68 It is not an object waiting to be discovered in
dusty historical archives, but an ever-unique, continuously
evolving product of each interpretive experience.69 “[T]o
understand and to interpret means to discover and recognize
a valid meaning. . . . It is the legal significance of the law—
and not the historical significance of the law’s promulgation
or of particular cases of its application—that he is trying to
understand.”70
Gadamer’s epistemology similarly rejects pragmatism as
a viable means of understanding a text. Pragmatist
interpreters—in the constitutional context, those often
associated with the “living constitutionalism” school—
understand legal texts in light of policy ends. As Judge
Posner explains, when interpreting texts, “pragmatists will
ask which of the possible resolutions has the best
consequences.”71 While pragmatism does not suffer from the
misplaced allegiance to method exhibited by textualism and
historicism,72 it nevertheless misconceives the nature of the
interpretive process and textual understanding. In
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, interpretation is a dialectic, a two
way conversation between the interpreter and interpreted
text. “[I]nterpretation is . . . [not] the imposition of the
interpreter’s views upon the text.”73 Instead, one interprets a
text by reading it through the lens of his experiential horizon,
but at the same time also allowing the apparent fair meaning
of the text shape that horizon. Thus, “[t]o understand . . . is
68. GADAMER, supra note 50, at 462.
69. See id. at 267; Feldman, supra note 53, at 684-85.
70. GADAMER, supra note 50, at 324.
71. Posner, supra note 30, at 1664.
72. See supra notes 63-64, 66 and accompanying text.
73. Eskridge, supra note 66, at 617.
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not merely an act from one’s subjectivity wherein the
interpreter is only injecting his or her own biased views on a
static text.”74 An interpreter cannot, as the pragamatist
would have, impose his own values or preferred results onto
the text. Rather, just as the “interpreter does not take the
text at face value . . . but instead challenges and questions its
assumptions to get at its truth value” the interpreter must
also place “her own prejudgments at risk, by opening them to
questions and challenges from the text.”75 On the
Gadamerian view, therefore, pragmatism is not really
interpretation at all. Interpretation involves the interpreter’s
speaking to the text and allowing the text to speak to him.76
Pragmatism, however, is a one way conversation where the
interpreter understands through his own horizon and
justifies his understanding by reference to a text that
represents another world-experience entirely.77
Thusly released from the shackles of any particular
interpretive methodology and liberated from the limits of
particular conceptions about what it means, the
constitutional text, in the Gadamerian hermeneutical
conception, is largely autonomous. Once enacted into law
through ratification, textual provisions of the Constitution
take on an existence of their own. As Justice Story observed
in his monumental and highly influential treatise on the
Constitution, “[n]othing but the text itself was adopted by the
people.”78
74. PORTER & ROBINSON, supra note 59, at 86.
75. Eskridge, supra note 66, at 623; see also PORTER & ROBINSON, supra note
59, at 86 (“[U]nderstanding is a historical act wherein one is responding to his or
her own tradition (relying on past experiences to make sense of the present) while
rethinking what was believed to be true because of what is encountered currently
in the text.”) (emphasis added). See generally PORTER & ROBINSON, supra, at 8689.
76. See GADAMER, supra note 51, at 379 (“To reach understanding in a dialogue
is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s
own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we do not
remain what we were.”).
77. See FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 31.
78. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
STATES 389 (1833).
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This sense in which the text of the Constitution is
autonomous is nicely explained by Professor Aleinikoff’s
analogy to a ship.79 In enacting a legal text, Aleinikoff writes,
the ratifier “builds a ship and charts its initial course.”80 The
ratifier does not captain the vessel, however; indeed, it does
not accompany it on its voyage at all. “[T]he ship’s ports-ofcall, safe harbors and ultimate destination may be a product
of the ship’s captain, the weather, and other factors not
identified at the time the ship sets sail.”81 On this view, once
enacted, a legal text takes on a character of its own;
numerous factors, some controllable and others not, play a
role in the law’s development. The textual meaning of the law
evolves and changes subject to these changing interpretive
circumstances, not because successive interpreters are not
true to the “real” meaning of the text, but because they “try
to understand the text”82 itself rather than any particular
conception of what the text means. Thus, the autonomoustext model “understands a [legal text] as an on-going process
(a voyage) . . . . The dimensions and structure of the craft
determine where it is capable of going, but the current course
is set primarily by the crew on board.”83 To bring the analogy
full-circle, the language and structure of a legal text set the
wide bounds of how it may be understood, but what it means
here and now, and how it applied to a particular case are
determined by contemporary judges, practitioners, and
scholars charged with implementing that text. Dennis
Goldford similarly explains:
When a shipyard builds a ship and launches it into the world,
however the ship is built – and the way it is built could well
structure where it can go in the world – the shipyard does not and
cannot control that ship as it makes its way in the world. The same
holds for language: We do not control our language once we have
launched it into the world.84

79. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21-22 (1988).
80. Id. at 21.
81. Id.
82. GADAMER, supra note 50, at 259.
83. Aleinikoff, supra note 79.
84. GOLDFORD, supra note 25, at 233.
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Working on the conception of the Constitution as an
autonomous text, the task of constitutional interpretation
takes on the image of Gadamer’s dialectic hermeneutics.
Gadamer’s literary hermeneutics sees interpretation as an
ongoing process of interactions between an interpreter and a
text, and identifies textual meaning as the product of this
process for a given interpreter at a given time. Legal scholars
sympathetic to autonomous-text constitutionalism similarly
contend that constitutional interpretation is not a
methodological search for a correct textual meaning, but is
instead a dialectic process wherein an interpreter interacts
with the constitutional text and understands that text as a
function of a merging of horizons.85
Ronald Dworkin, who believes that Gadamer’s account of
interpretation “strikes the right note” in a constitutional
context,86 analogizes the process of constitutional
interpretation to the sequential writing of a story in which
different authors add successive parts to the narrative.87
Successive authors of a chain-novel each make unique
contributions to the story, but do so with an eye towards
making the novel as a whole—both that which has already
been written and that which will be written after their
section—as good a book as possible.88 While an individual
author will certainly inject his own subjective creativity into
his portion of the narrative, therefore, he does so with a
measure of constraint, building on what has already been
written rather than injecting an unrelated plotline into the
story, and setting a foundation for what has yet to be written
rather than leaving subsequent authors without anything to
build on.89 In a similar vein, judges, lawyers, and scholars
interpret legal texts through their own subjective
experiential lenses. But, their understandings of those texts
are not merely reflections of their personal preferences; nor
are they slavish recitations of authorial intent or the text’s
plain meaning. Instead, their understandings are a product
85. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 52 (“Creative interpretation, on the
constructive view, is a matter of interaction between purpose and object.”).
86. Id. at 62.
87. Id. at 228-38.
88. Id. at 229.
89. Id. at 229-31.
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of their interacting with the text; they act upon the text by
filtering it through their unique selves, and they are acted
upon by the text as well by allowing whatever they perceive
to be the text’s fair meaning to impact their interpretive
consciousnesses. A similar account is offered by Christopher
Wolfe:
Perhaps the best analogy [to constitutional interpretation] one
might offer is the following. An actor is said to “interpret” a
particular character in a play. This might mean that his aim is to
play his part so that it conforms as closely as possible to the intent
of the author of the play. . . . It might also mean, however, that the
actor has freedom, within the bounds of what is conceivably
consistent with the play, to play the role in a variety of different
ways . . . . The quality of the actor’s “interpretation” of a role, in this
sense, could be said to turn . . . on his “creativity” . . . . This
broad . . . conception of an actor’s job of “interpreting” a role seems
to be the sense in which modern constitutional “interpretation”
should be understood.90

On this view, interpretation is a personal, interactive
experience with the text. An interpreter does not simply act
upon the text, working to discover some preexistent objective
meaning. Textual understanding is created by the
interpreter. Like Dworkin’s chain novelist and Wolfe’s actor,
a constitutional interpreter reads within certain
constraints—as Gadamer puts it, the interpreter allows the
text itself to influence his experiential horizon as that
horizon itself colors his understanding of the text.
A similarly Gadamerian account of constitutional
interpretation is offered by Dennis Goldford, another
proponent of autonomous-textualism. For Goldford,
“[textual] meaning is always constructed rather than
discovered.”91 Goldford thus criticizes both originalist (what I
call here “historicist”) and non-originalist (what I refer to as
“pragmatist”) interpretation, for both methodologies see
constitutional meaning as a mixed object to be discovered,
whether in the Federalist Papers and Madison’s notes on the
Philadelphia Convention, in Rawl’s theory of justice, or

90. CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 327-28 (1986).
91. GOLDFORD, supra note 25, at 190.
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Posner’s utilitarian economics.92 For Goldford, like Gadamer,
however, “the Constitution must be understood not as an
object but as a social practice, an ongoing and participative
interpretive activity.”93 Interpretation, in other words, is an
interactive activity between every interpreter and the
Constitution; as interpreters of the Constitution, “we are
active creators . . . but we create only within the structured
context of the past.”94 In other words, we create textual
meaning by filtering the Constitution through our respective
experiential consciousnesses, but if we are truly interpreting
(instead of imposing our preferences on) the text, the
meaning we create is constrained by what the Constitution
itself tells us it should mean. Meaningful constitutional
interpretation “relies ultimately on the reader’s willingness
to participate as an active subject in the activity of construing
meaning.”95 Quoting Georgia Warnke, and hearkening back
to Gadamer’s cyclical interpretive dialectic, Goldford
observes that “[t]he past acquires its meaning in light of
present experiences and anticipations while the meaning of
the present and anticipation of the future are conditioned by
the way in which the past has been understood.”96 Thus, for
proponents
of
autonomous-text
constitutionalism,
“constitutional interpretation is an ontological event in which
meaning comes into existence,” and that constitutional
92. Id. at 194-95.
93. Id. at 198.
94. Id. at 278. Immediately before this line, Goldford also quotes approvingly
from Marx, who observed that “[m]en make their own history, but they do not
make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by
themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from
the past.” KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF NAPOLEON (1852), reprinted
in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 595 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978). Marx’s historical
observation translates neatly into the constitutional interpretive context. While
every interpreter makes a constitutional meaning based on his own experiences
with the world, he does not do so on a blank slate; the constitutional text itself,
and everything that has been said, written, and done in relation to that text
stands before him, and to truly interpret he must take those realities—the text’s
experiential horizon—as a serious account of textual meaning.
95. GOLDFORD, supra note 25, at 275.
96. Id. at 278 (quoting GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS,
TRADITION, AND REASON 38 (1987)).
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meaning “comes into being through the interpretive
encounter between the [reader] and the text.”97
Autonomous text constitutionalism thus entails a
conception of the Constitution as an autonomous text whose
meaning becomes clear to each reader on their own terms
through a dialectic conversation between the interpreter and
the text. On the autonomous-text view, therefore, the
Constitution is understood as encompassing multiple
meanings; it is the text that is binding, and when fairly read
that text and its horizon can legitimately lend itself to many
different understandings depending on the subjective
experiential consciousness of the interpreter with which it is
merged.98 Thus, “each interpreter extracts a new meaning
from the ‘common object’ of interpretation,”99 and a text can
only be said to be truly interpreted “if it is understood in a
different way as the occasion requires.”100 As Stephen
Feldman observes, “as the horizon of the present
[interpreter] shifts . . . the meaning of the Constitution is
always potentially new and different.”101
Autonomous-text constitutionalism thus supports a
pluralist interpretive theory. The binding Constitution is the
actual autonomous-text of the Constitution, the words on the
page that we typically refer as “the Constitution.” Because it
is this text—rather than any particular conception of what
this text means—that is legally authoritative, the

97. Feldman, supra note 53, at 693.
98. See PORTER & ROBINSON, supra note 59, at 86 (“Understanding happens
through a gradual and perpetual interplay between the subject matter and the
interpreter’s initial position — a fusion of one’s own horizon and the horizon of
the text or other. Within this fusion, Gadamer denies the possibility of any single
and objectively true interpretation that could transcend all viewpoints.”)
(emphasis added).
99. Campos, supra note 7, at 1072.
100. GADAMER, supra note 50, at 309; see EAGLETON, supra note 67, at 62 (“[For
Gademer, all] interpretation is situational, shaped and constrained by the
historically relative criteria of a particular culture; there is no possibility of
knowing the literary text ‘as it is.’”).
101. Feldman, supra note 53, at 693.
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autonomous-text of the Constitution has no fixed meaning.102
Nor, therefore, can any interpretive understanding of the
autonomous constitutional text claim to be the right one. As
with all hermeneutical understanding, constitutional
understanding is a constantly changing, continually evolving
thing. Every interpreter arrives at his or her own
understanding of the Constitution, a singular hermeneutical
experience as unique as the historical-experiential horizon of
each interpreter.103 “We – always and necessarily we – decide”
what the text of the Constitution means in practice.104 We
decide what the Constitution means, and because each of us
approaches the constitutional text with a unique experiential
horizon, we can each be expected to reach a unique
understanding of the Constitution. Thus, while the need to
merge with the Constitution’s relatively fixed horizon
structures interpretation and limits the range of possible
interpretive understandings, interpretation is nevertheless
“not determined if by that we mean that there is a single
right answer to constitutional questions.”105
II. AUTONOMOUS-TEXT CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ACTION: THE
CASE FROM JEWISH LAW
While autonomous-text constitutionalism is certainly not
the mainstream in American interpretive theory, it does have
a rich experiential tradition in the Jewish law system. Part
II.A begins by explaining how Jewish law, or Halakhah,
retains a constitutional character, recognizing a complex
hierarchy of unchangeable, fundamental constitutional legal
norms and subordinate rules and principles established
through
legislation
by
constitutionally
authorized
lawmaking bodies. Part II.B explains how interpretation in
Jewish law constitutionalism follows the contours of
Gadamerian autonomous-textualism. Finally, Part II.C
discusses how the theoretical interpretive pluralism
102. See GOLDFORD, supra note 25, at 166 (“If the real constitutional text is the
document itself, then all understandings and interpretations of that text are
relevant and none is privileged.”).
103. Campos, supra note 7, at 1072 (“[E]ach interpreter extracts a new meaning
from the ‘common object’ of interpretation.”).
104. GOLDFORD, supra note 25, at 15.
105. Id. at 279.
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supported by autonomous-text constitutionalism plays out in
Halakhic practice, which requires a uniformity of conduct
under the law.
A. Jewish Law as a Constitutional System
At its core, the Jewish legal system is, like its American
counterpart, a constitutional order. Constitutional systems
can be identified by three salient characteristics, which go to
the very heart of what a constitutional form of government
is, and which are exhibited by both the Jewish and American
legal regimes. First, constitutional systems include a set of
supreme legal norms that are relatively stable and
unchanging, and which are normative in the sense that they
are enacted by the ultimate source of legal authority. Second,
constitutional regimes also comprise a collection of
subordinate legal norms enacted by inferior law-making
authorities whose legislative power is not normative but
instead is created by the system’s superior constitutional
rules. Finally, constitutional systems maintain that the legal
rules promulgated by subordinate law-making authorities
must be consistent with the superior constitutional norms in
terms of both substance and procedure.106
American constitutionalism, the quintessential case of
constitutional government, rightly exhibits these three
essential characteristics. The United States Constitution is
the self-declared “[S]upreme Law of the Land”;107 it is fairly
stable, requiring extraordinary popular effort to amend;108
and it claims normative authority as the enactment of “We
the People,” the fundamental source for legal-political
authority.109 The United States Constitution empowers
various subordinate law-making authorities—the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches—to enact new legal norms
within particularly delineated spheres and in accordance
with certain procedures and substantive limitations.110 As
this arrangement of supreme, normative and created,
106. Cf. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 12, at 48-53.
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
108. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
109. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
110. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III.
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subordinate lawmaking authorities indicates, American
constitutionalism accepts that laws enacted by subordinate
legislative authorities, who derive their power from the
Constitution itself, must be consistent with the substantive
and procedural limitations imposed by that superior legal
ordinal, a requirement enforced through the practice of
judicial review.111
The Jewish legal system, too, exhibits the essential
characteristics of constitutional regimes. It includes a
superior law that claims normative authority as the product
of the ultimate source of legal authority; its superior
constitutional law empowers inferior law makers to
promulgate new legal norms; and the legal pronouncements
of subordinate legislative authorities must be consistent with
the norms established by the superior constitutional law.
The fundamental legal norm, the Constitution of the
Jewish legal system is the Torah.112 Jewish tradition
maintains that the Torah was revealed to the Jews by God at
Mount Sinai, and that the Jews freely consented to abide by
the Torah, thereby sealing their obligation to be bound by its
content.113 Thus, the substantive content of the Torah, the

111. See generally SOTORIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL POWER
(1993).
112. See 1 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 232
(Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Skyes trans., 1994) (“[T]he basic norm of Jewish
law . . . is the fundamental norm that everything set forth in the Torah, i.e., the
Written Law, is binding on the Jewish legal system.”); AARON KIRSCHENBAUM,
EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES IN LAW 10 (1991) (“The ultimate
legal principle (Grundnorm) is the rule that the Torah, the Five Books of Moses,
is of binding authority for the Jewish legal system.”).
113. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 86a. Throughout this Article,
translations directly from Hebrew are supplied by the Author unless otherwise
stated. For a published translation of the Babylonian Talmud, see BABYLONIAN
TALMUD, Shabbat 86a (R. I. Epstein trans., 1938).
Rav Avdimi bar Hama bar Hasa said, “[Prior to the revelation at Sinai,
God suspended a mountain over them [the Jews], and said to them: ‘If
you accept the Torah, good; but if not this shall be your grave.’” Rav Aha
bar Yaakov responded, “If so, this episode provides a strong basis for
rejecting our obligation to the Torah!” Rava explained, “That is true, but
they [the Jews] subsequently consented to the Torah’s laws without
coercion.”
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basic, constitutional norm of Jewish law, is normatively
authoritative as the revealed will of God, and that content is
binding on the Jewish people due to their enacting God’s will
into law through an act of collective popular consent.
The Torah-constitution of the Jewish law system thus
encompasses the entire legal corpus revealed by God and
accepted by the Jews at Mount Sinai. This complete
revelation includes two distinct but related textual
components: the Written Law—the text of the Pentateuch,
the first five books of the Old Testament—and the Oral Law,
a comprehensive collection of explanations and elaborations
on the Written Law.114 According to Jewish tradition, the
Written Law was related by God himself to Moses who in
turn recorded God’s words verbatim, forming the first five
books of the Hebrew Bible. The Written Law is relatively
Id.; see also SIFRE, A TANNAITIC COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF DEUTERONOMY 35253 (Reuven Hammer trans., 1986) (“When God revealed Himself to give the Torah
to the Jews, He first went to all the nations of the world [to offer them the Torah],
but they did not want to accept it. . . . [Each nation asked about the content of the
Torah’s laws, and upon hearing them, declined to accept them] . . . Finally, God
approached the Jews and offered them the Torah, and they opened their mouths
and said, ‘whatever God will command us, we will do and we will listen.’”);
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Avodah Zarah 2b.
114. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 31a (“A certain gentile approached
Shammai and asked, ‘How many Torahs do you have?’ Shammai answered, ‘we
have two Torahs, one Written and one Oral.’”); Samuel J. Levine, Jewish Legal
Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts,
24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 444-45 (1997).
While typically associated with the written text of the twenty-four books of the
Old Testament, in Jewish legal thought, the “Torah” as a descriptive of the
fundamental constitutional norms of the Jewish legal system encompasses far
more than the Bible. The Torah as constitution includes the Written Torah, the
text of what is popularly thought of as the Old Testament, as well as the Oral
Torah, an extensive collection of explanations and explications of the text of the
Written Torah traditionally held to have been revealed to Moses by God. See id.
at 445.The Oral Torah was as its name implies transmitted orally from generation
to generation until it was compiled, edited, and committed to writing in the
Mishnah and Talmud. See MISHNAH, Avos 1:1; see also MAIMONIDES, Introduction
to MISHNEH TORAH. Thus, the constitutional law of the Jewish legal system
includes not only the Written Torah, the Bible, but also the Mishnah and the
Talmud, and therefore, specific rules of law clearly explicated in the Talmud are
held to be as immutable as a verse of Scripture. See R. JACOB B. ASHER, ARBAH
TURIM, Hoshen Mishpat § 25; R. JOSEF CARO, SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat §
25:1.
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brief, however, and does not explain the details of many of its
provisions. In addition to the Written Law, therefore, God
also related to Moses the Oral Law, which included
explanations and elaborations on the minutiae of many of the
doctrines covered only generally in the Written Law.115
While the Written Law portion of the Torah was
immediately written by Moses upon his receiving it from God,
the Oral Law, as its name implies, was sustained for a time
as an oral tradition passed from teacher to student.116
Eventually the Oral Law was committed to writing in order
to prevent an increasingly complex oral law tradition’s being
forgotten by subsequent generations of increasingly pressed
and persecuted Jews.117 The Talmud was the product of this
writing of the Oral Law. Consequently, Jewish law considers
the redaction of the Talmud sometime in the early sixth
century118 to be a seminal point in Jewish legal history. At
that point, the whole of the constitutional law of Judaism was
finalized in written form—the Written Law in the
Pentateuch and the Oral Law in the Talmud—and all
subsequent legislation or interpretation would be considered
inferior law that could not contradict the final legal
conclusions recorded in the Talmud.119

115. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Megillah 19b; ELON, supra note 112, at 200-03.
116. See MISHNAH, Avos 1:1; see also MAIMONIDES, Introduction to MISHNEH
TORAH. There are a number of reasons why the bulk of the Torah-constitution was
initially transmitted orally rather than in writing. In a formal sense, the Torah
itself instructs, “Write down these commandments,” Exodus 34:27, which the
Talmud interpreted to mean that only the Written Law may be written, while the
Oral Law must be sustained as an unwritten tradition. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Gittin 60b. One pragmatic explanation for this prohibition on reducing the Oral
Law to writing is that “oral instruction requires constant thought and
concentration to keep the material in mind, and consequently, many more laws
will be more fully developed through the deliberations and reasoning processes
involved in teaching and studying the Oral Law.” R. Joshua Falk, Introduction to
Sefer Me’irat Einayim. For a more extensive discussion of this issue see ELON,
supra note 112, at 224-26.
117. See ELON, supra note 112, at 226.
118. See id.
119. See CARO, supra note 114, §25:1 (declaring that judicial rulings that err in
matters of law explicitly decided by the Talmud are considered legal nullities);
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Thus, the Torah and Talmud together comprise the
Constitution—the fundamental legal norm—of the Jewish
legal system. As Professor Levine explains, “[t]o describe a
law or legal principle as d’oraita [“of the Torah”] is roughly
equivalent to describing a law or principle in American law
as being based in the Constitution.”120 Interpretations of the
Torah and Talmud are therefore the Jewish law equivalent
of constitutional interpretations establishing fundamental
rules of law.121
The Torah-constitution itself empowers various
institutions with subordinate legislative and judicial
authority. Judges are authorized by the Torah to interpret
and apply normative Torah law to cases brought before them
for resolution.122 In addition to judicial power, the Torahconstitution also grants subordinate legislative powers to
several institutions, including rabbinic courts, lay communal
legislatures, and a king or other national executive.123 The
Torah says that “you shall not deviate from the law that they
[the judges] shall tell you.”124 The Talmud understands this
verse to authorize courts to not only decide cases but to also
promulgate new laws as the occasion requires.125 Relying on
this interpretation, Maimonides thus wrote:
[i]t is immaterial whether the direction given by the court concerns
the
Oral
Law . . . or
whether
it concerns legislative
enactments . . . measures devised by the members of the court to
serve as a fence around the [Torah] law or designed to meet the

Levine, supra note 114, at 476 (“[W]hen the Talmud was compiled, later
authorities accepted as binding the legal decisions found in it.”).
120. Levine, supra note 114, at 445.
121. See id.
122. See Deuteronomy 17:8-11.
123. See 2 ELON, supra note 112, at 485 (“[E]ven though halakhic authorities
disagreed as to what specific verse constitutes the source of delegation of
legislative authority in the Jewish legal system, there is consensus that the grant
of such authority derives from Scripture, Jewish law’s ‘constitution.’”).
124. Deuteronomy 17:11.
125. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot 19b; 2 ELON, supra note 112, at 481-83.
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needs of the time. Obedience to the court in all these matters is a
positive commandment.126

Thus, Jewish law courts, or battei din (singular, bet din)
function in both judicial and legislative capacities, enacting
new rules of law referred to in rabbinic literature as takkanot
(singular, takkanah) and gezierot (singular, gezerah). A
takkanah (literally, “fixing”) is a legislative enactment that
principally addresses matters of social rather than strictly
religious concern; thus, the main aim of takkanot is tikum
olam, “the fixing of the world.” A gezerah (literally, “decree”),
by contrast is a legislative measure aimed at protecting
normative Torah laws from being violated. The goal of these
rules is l’migdar miltah, to build a fence around a Torah law
principle by prohibiting acts permitted under normative
Torah law in order to prevent the Torah precept’s being
violated through inadvertence or confusion.127
The Torah also grants subordinate legislative authority
to every Jewish community or its representatives. Jewish law
equates the status of lay communal majorities with that of
rabbinic courts. The judges of every generation have power
to authoritatively resolve questions of law and enact new
norms for their constituencies128 because “the members of
each generation agree to accept the rulings and enactments
of the highest court in their generation.”129 A beis din’s
legislative and judicial power, in other words, stems from
some of its constituency’s popular consent to its authority.
Thus, whenever this basis of popular acceptance is present,
126. MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, The Laws of Apostates, ch. 1:1; see also
NAHMANIDES, COMMENTARY ON MAIMONIDES’ SEFER HAMITZVOT § 1.
127. See THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 74 (Menachem Elon ed., 1975).
The term gezerah is generally applied to the determination of directives
aimed at deterring man from the prohibited, at making “a fence around
the Torah”—i.e., directives of a negative nature prohibiting the
performance of a particular act. The term takkanah, on the other hand,
generally refers to directives aimed at imposing a duty to perform a
particular act, i.e., directives of a positive nature enjoining the doing of
a particular matter.
Id. (citing Introduction to MAIMONEDES’ COMMENTARY TO THE MISHNAH).
128. See infra Part II.C.
129. R. ELIJAH MIZRAHI, RESPONSA ELIJAH MIZRAHI NO. 57.
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the institution in which that public trust resides “has the
same authority as the Sanhedrin in Jerusalem.”130 The lay
leaders of a community have the same constitutionallygranted legislative power as a court “since the townspeople
look to the communal leaders for guidance in matters
affecting the public and agree to accept their
determinations.”131
The Torah-constitution is the fundamental legal norm of
the Jewish law system; it is unchangeable, and retains
supreme legal authority. The legislative authority held by
courts, lay leaders, and the national executive, by contrast, is
not normative, but is created by the Torah-constitution.
Thus, rabbinic and lay legislation,132 post-Talmudic
interpretations of Torah-constitutional law,133 and legal
rulings called responsa134—which claim legal authority only
by virtue of a constitutional grant of law-making power—are
subordinate to the fundamental Torah law.135 In Jewish law,
therefore, there is a basic jurisprudential distinction between
laws that are de-oraita (“of the Torah”) and those that are de-

130. Id.
131. R. ELIJAH MIZRAHI, RESPONSA ELIJAH MIZRAHI NO. 57; see also R. ISAAC B.
SHESHET, RESPONSA RIBASH NO. 249. For another example of an halakhic
authority equating the status of the kehillah with that of a court via the rule that
“Jephthah in his generation is like Samuel in his generation,” see BABYLONIAN
TALMUD, Rosh hashana 25b.
132. On the subordinate authority of legislative enactments promulgated by
rabbinic or lay authorities, see 2 ELON, supra note 112, at 496-502, 736-78.
133. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, supra note 126, ch. 2:1.
134.
[R]esponsa literature represents the decisions and conclusions written
down by halakhic scholars in answer to written questions submitted to
them. . . . The responsa represent legal decisions on concrete questions
arising in daily life and served as the main vehicle for creativity and
evolution of Jewish law in post-Talmudic times. This body of literature
is the case law of the Jewish legal system [though it does not have the
same kind of binding authority as does the case law of a particular
jurisdiction in the American system], estimated to include [at least]
300,000 judgments and decisions.
ELON, supra note 112, at 13.
135. See 2 ELON, supra note 112, at 478-81.
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rabbanan (“of the rabbis”).136 De-oraita laws, those that are
found in the Torah-constitution, are considered superior to
and more stringent than de-rabbanan laws, those created by
subordinate legislative authorities.137 For example, while the
duty to abide by subordinate legislation is always superseded
by certain broad principles, such as the obligation to preserve
human dignitary, normative Torah-law proscriptions take
precedence over the preservation of similar policy concerns.138
Similarly, subordinate legislation cannot contradict Torahconstitutional law, as the Talmud rules, “a court may not
enact legislation uprooting a Biblical prohibition by
permitting the performance of a prohibited act.”139 While the
Torah itself permits subordinate legislative authorities to
enact new rules that contradict Torah-constitutional law in
certain pressing circumstances,140 this extraordinary power
derives from the Torah-constitution itself.141 This power is
thus akin to the United States Constitution’s, permitting
Congress to suspend the fundamental constitutional right to

136. ELON, supra note 112, at 207-17.
137. See generally 1 R. ISAAC HERZOG, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS
2-11 (2d ed. 1966).
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138. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, The Laws of Mixed-Kinds, supra note 126, at
ch. 10:29 (“Rabbinic prohibitions are always overridden by the obligation to
preserve human dignity.”); see also id. at The laws of Shabbos, ch. 6:22. (“If a
person is traveling at the onset of Sabbath, and he is carrying coins, he should
give the purse to a non-Jew to hold for him during the Sabbath . . . for if we did
not permit him to ask a non-Jew to carry the purse for him [a rabbinic prohibition]
he would come to carry it himself, thereby violating a biblical prohibition.”). For
an extensive discussion of the relative stringencies and leniencies associated with
Biblical and rabbinic laws, see ELON, supra note 112, at 212-14.
139. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yevamoth 89a. Subordinate legislation may,
however, supplement Torah law proscriptions by prohibiting through gezeirot acts
permitted under normative Torah rules. See RASHI, Yevamoth 89a (Shev V’al
Ta’aseh).
140. See generally 2 ELON, supra note 112, at 503-33.
141. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, 2 Yevamoth 90b (deriving broad authority to
legislate contrary to Torah law in order to restore the Jewish people to general
observance of the Torah from the scriptural incident of Elijah on Mount Carmel).
See generally 2 ELON, supra note 112, at 503-33.
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habeas corpus in cases of war or rebellion,142 and thus does
not undermine the constitutional supremacy of Torah law
over subordinate legislation.
These basic structural similarities provide a basis for
instructively
comparing
Jewish
and
American
constitutionalism. Nevertheless, there are some fundamental
differences between the normative bases and functions of
constitutionalism in Jewish and American law, which
warrant mention. Jewish law constitutionalism is a religious
life-work founded on God’s command,143 whereas the
American constitutional experience is a fundamentally
political and secular endeavor grounded in the aggregate will
of “We the People” distilled through compromise and
negotiation from competing normatively legitimate interests
and conceptions of the good.144 Thus, the Jewish legal system,
viewed as a product of God’s unilateral command takes shape
as more than a legal system in the Western sense. Whereas
the Anglo-American legal tradition might view law as a
secular, public, and political institution, Jewish law is “not
only a legal system,” but “the life work of a religious
community”145 that strives to morally elevate every aspect of
its adherents’ public and private lives.146 Jewish law, thus, is
142. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
safety may require it.”).
143. See Suzzane Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the
Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV.
813, 894 (1993). See generally ELON, supra note 112, at 18-19.
144. See John L. S. Simpkins, Structuring State Constitutional Review:
Comparative Perspectives, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 535, 548 (2009) (“A
constitution is an expression of the collective will of the people as to how they will
govern themselves as well as a product of the kind of political bargaining that
characterizes the law-making process.”).
145. Stone, supra note 143, at 894.
146. See R. Isadore Grunfeld, Introduction to R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH,
HOREB: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH LAWS AND OBSERVANCES xlvii (Dayan Isidore
Grunfeld trans., 7th ed. 2002) (“What the Torah desires to regulate is . . . the
whole of human existence—man’s sensual impulses, his needs and desires, his
individual life as well as that of his family, society, and State.” (quoting R. SAMSON
1 RAPHAEL HIRSCH, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 83 (1912)).
The Hebrew word that refers to individual laws and the Jewish legal system as a
whole, “halakhah,” translates literally as “the way to go.” Thus, halakhah “plays
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all-encompassing, it touches every aspect of life,147 and even
when the law does not directly demand a particular course of
conduct, the personal discretion that remains is always
colored by a moral duty to approach the choice among
permissible courses of conduct from a perspective influenced
by broad Torah-based principles.148
Jewish law’s religious character animates several
doctrines that blur the demarcation between legal command
and moral-ethical obligations, a notion that lacks any
parallel in the American constitutional experience. In Jewish
law, for example, a religious sense of awe and trepidation
animates the judicial process as human jurists face the
prospect of creatively interpreting and (mis)applying God’s
sacred law,149 which Jewish tradition views as part of the very
fabric of creation.150 Also, Jewish law strongly favors judicial
decisions that go “beyond the letter of the law”;151 as
guardians of religious life and the moral development of
individuals and the community, Jewish law judges are
an inseparable . . . part in Jews’ commitment to the Torah, the Jewish tradition
broadly conceived, which is a holistic way of life interweaving law, theology,
spirituality and the cultivation of virtues.” Y. Michael Barilan, Her Pain Prevails
and Her Judgment Respected—Abortion in Judaism, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 97, 137
(2009).
147. See Levine, supra note 114, at 469 (“Jewish law consists of a detailed legal
system, regulating both public and private life . . . [and] presents at least
guidelines for virtually every aspect of ideal societal and personal behavior.”).
148. See, e.g., 3 RAMBAN NACHMANIDES, COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH, Leviticus
19:2 (Charles B. Chavel trans., 1972) (cautioning that the strict legal boundaries
of the Torah leave room for man to debase himself, to become “disgusting within
the bounds of the Torah,” and that therefore the Torah teaches that one should
be guided by the Torah’s general morality even within the sphere of conduct that
the law leaves to personal discretion). See generally 1 ELON, supra note 112, at
141-89 (discussing the role of general moral principles in Jewish law).
149. See Jeffrey I. Roth, Responding to Dissent in Jewish Law: Suppression
Versus Self-Restraint, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 31, 86-91 (1987); Yuval Sinai, The
Religious Perspective on the Judge’s Role in Talmudic Law, 25 J.L. & RELIGION
357, 358, 361-67 (2009) (discussing Jewish legal decisors aversion to issuing
practical rulings due to their “fear of deciding” arising from Jewish law’s Divine
origin and religious character).
150. See ASHER, supra note 114, § 1.
151. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba Kamma 99b-100a; RAMBAN NACHMANIDES,
supra note 148, Deuteronomy 6:18. See generally ELON, supra note 112, at 155-67.
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supposed to not merely apply the law, but to rule with an eye
towards engendering moral-ethical excellence by at times
requiring more or perhaps less than the law fairly
demands.152 Thus, at times, Jewish law decisors may
acknowledge that, strictly speaking, the law might only
require an ethically minimalist course of conduct, and they
may therefore maintain, “so is the halakhah, but we shall not
instruct so,”153 instead setting the ethical bar higher than
legally required.154 Similarly, Jewish legal discussions often
revolve around a distinction between judicially enforceable
legal obligations and moral duties imposed by “the laws of
[H]eaven.”155 This distinction between legal and moral
obligations takes place within Jewish law; the duty to uphold
obligations imposed by the “law of Heaven” remains a legal,
albeit judicially unenforced imperative.156 Also, in a number
152. See R. JOSHUA FALK, DERISHAH, Hoshen Mishpat 1:2.
When it says [that judges must strive to issue] “true and honest
judgments,” it means that they must rule with an eye towards the time
and place so that their decisions will be “truthful,” and that they should
not always rule from the strict law of the Torah because at times the
judge must rule beyond the letter of the law in light of the circumstances
posed by the case. When the judge does not do this, even if his ruling is
legally true, it is not also “honest” in the sense that the sages taught,
“Jerusalem was only destroyed because they supported their judicial
decisions solely by the Torah’s law and did not go beyond the letter of the
law.”
Id.; see also R. JOEL SIRKIS, BAYIT HADASH, Hoshen Mishpat 12:4 (“It is the practice
of every Jewish court to compel the wealthy to perform their [moral] obligation
where it is right and proper, even if the strict law does not so require.”).
153. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Menahot 31a-31b; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat
12b-13a.
154. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba Kamma 30b (maintaining that even
though the law is that straw left by its owner in the public domain in order to be
trampled into manure by the public is considered ownerless and anyone who
takes possession of it may keep it; we do not teach the law as such, and if asked
for a prospective advisory opinion a legal scholar should instruct the questioner
not to take the straw); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Avodah Zarah 37b; R. ASHER B.
JEHIEL, ROSH, Beza 2:19.
155. See MISHNAH, Baba Kamma 6:4; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Baba
Kamma 55b-56a. See generally 1 ELON, supra note 112, at 145-48.
156. Some Jewish law authorities maintain that while duties imposed by “the
law of Heaven” do not occasion judicial compulsion to force compliance, courts are
nevertheless authorized to bring extra-judicial pressure to bear on recalcitrant
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of areas, the sages of the Talmud acknowledged the legal
possibility of what they considered morally bereft conduct,
but effectively prohibited such conduct by expressing their
extreme displeasure with those that might act within the
letter of the law but without the religious strivings that
animate the legal system.157 In great contrast to Jewish law’s
religious foundation, American legal tradition, animated by
classical liberalism, is highly secular, focusing on regulation
of the public sphere by mediating between competing
conceptions of the good and leaving private conduct fully to
the moral discretion of the autonomous-self.158 Thus, unlike
in the Jewish law system, the juridical instrumentalities of
the legal system enforce the law alone; they do not urge
ethically laudable conduct beyond the demands of the law,
and certainly do not take it upon themselves to enforce such
extra-legal moral strivings.159
These fundamental differences related to the religious
character of Jewish law and America’s secular
constitutionalism do not, as some scholars have argued,
parties to uphold these obligations. See R. SHLOMO LURIA, YAM SHEL SHLOMO,
Baba Kamma 6:6.
157. See ELON, supra note 112, at 148-54.
158. See Margit Warburg, Globalization, Migration and the Two Types of
Religious Boundary: A European Perspective, in RELIGION, GLOBALIZATION, AND
CULTURE 79, 96 (Peter Beyer & Lori Beaman eds., 2007) (“The Western idea of a
secular basis for law and order stems from the Enlightenment and its
confrontation with the political dominance of religion.”); see also JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, RABBIS AND LAWYERS: THE JOURNEY FROM TORAH TO CONSTITUTION 44
(1990) (“When Jewish law is compared with American law, the contrast is
striking. Modern legal thought compartmentalizes, insisting upon boundaries,
limits, separations, and carefully defined spheres. It imposes distinctions—
between secular and religious, legal and moral, public and private.”); Ariel L.
Bendor, Are There Any Limits to Justiceability? The Jurisprudential and
Constitutional Controversy in Light of the Israeli and American Experience, 7 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 311, 326-27 (“[T]he law, by its very nature, exists within
defined and narrow boundaries; the halacha, by its very nature, extends into
every human concern . . . .”).
159. The legal positivism of Bentham, Austin, and Hart has influenced theories
of adjudication that demand judges enforce the law and not morality. Compare
this approach with ELON, supra note 112, at 8 (“Jewish law, functioning as a legal
system, itself impels recourse to a moral imperative . . . and in doing so sometimes
prepares the way to the conversion of the moral imperative into a fully sanctioned
norm.”).
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preclude meaningful comparison of the two systems.160 First,
it has been pointed out that American constitutionalism rests
on the Jewish law constitutional narrative in a historical and
cultural sense.161 On this view, American constitutional
theory draws heavily on its Judaic predecessor via
Christianity’s rediscovery of rabbinic texts following the
Reformation, and it would therefore be reasonable for the
latter to serve as an instructive counter-example of legal
interpretation for the former.162 Additionally, an instructive
comparison on interpretation in Jewish and American
160. See Levine, supra note 114, at 442-43. In addition to the foundational
comparative hurdles outlined in this Article, drawing lessons from Jewish law for
American constitutional interpretation faces important methodological
difficulties. First, any attempt to equate Jewish and American constitutional
interpretation threatens to impose on one system artificial jurisprudential
categories borrowed from the other, thereby distorting each. See Hanina BenMenahem, Postscript: The Judicial Process and the Nature of Jewish Law, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW 421, 422-35 (N. S.
Hecht et al. eds., 1996) (pointing out some difficulties with applying Western
jurisprudential categories to understanding Jewish law); Suzzane Last Stone,
Comment, Judaism and Postmodernism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1681, 1688 (1993).
The very notion that there is a Jewish interpretive tradition “requires the collapse
of distinctions [in approach] between all rabbinic periods and genres.” Stone,
supra. Jewish law has always been a diverse enterprise; the substance of the law
and the jurisprudential outlook of Jewish law scholars has varied widely at
different times, and at the same time in different geographical areas. See BenMenahem, supra, at 430. It would be ironic, indeed, to advocate that autonomoustextualism and interpretive pluralism are the way that Judaism approaches legal
interpretation; a legal tradition that embraces a multiplicity of substantive views
about what the law is can be rightly expected to include more than one
jurisprudential theory about how those substantive views are derived from
normative textual sources. For reviews of the differing interpretive approaches in
the Jewish law tradition, see ELON, supra note 112, at 400-21; Stone, supra, at
1688-91; see also Ben-Menahem, supra, at 430-31.
161. See KAHN, supra note 2, at 16, 46-66 (1999); Fernando Rey Martinez, The
Religious Character of the American Constitution: Puritanism and
Constitutionalism in the United States, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 459, 461 (2003).
162. See ERIC NELSON, THE HEBREW REPUBLIC: JEWISH SOURCES AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 1-28 (2010); POLITICAL
HEBRAISM: JUDAIC SOURCES IN EARLY MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Gordon
Schochet et al. eds., 2008); Andrew Murphy, New Israel in New England: The
American Jerimiad and the Hebrew Scriptures, 4 HEBRAIC POL. STUD. 128 (2009);
Shlomo C. Pill, Jewish Law Antecedents to American Constitutional Thought, 85
Miss. L.J. (forthcoming 2016); Gordon Schochet, Introduction: Hebraic Roots,
Calvinist Plantings, American Branches, 4 HEBRAIC POL. STUD. 99, 101-02 (2009).
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constitutionalism is possible, despite the fundamental
differences between these systems, because the exercise is
pragmatic, not formal. The argument here is not that both
American and Jewish law are constitutional systems, and
that therefore the interpretive conceptions of Jewish law
must also be applicable in the American context. Instead, as
Part III of this Article will bear out, the contention of this
Article is that constitutional interpretation in Jewish law
offers an experiential model of how Gadamerian
autonomous-textualism can work in practice to mitigate
many of the central problems of American constitutional
theory. It is on that strictly instrumental basis, rather than
due to some irrefutable congruency between Jewish and
American constitutionalism, that the instructive comparison
set out here proceeds.163
B. Autonomous-Text Constitutionalism in Jewish Legal
Tradition
The Jewish law constitutional tradition offers a living,
vibrant example of autonomous-text constitutionalism in
practice. As expected of an autonomous-text constitutional
system, Jewish law constitutional tradition and practice
exhibits three important characteristics. First, Jewish
tradition maintains that once enacted into law, the Torahconstitution of the Jewish law system became an autonomous
text, detached from the intentions of its Divine author and
not susceptible to overnice formalistic constructions or onesided impositions of the interpreter’s subjective preferences.
163. See SCHREIBER, supra note 5 (discussing the pragmatic value of
comparative Jewish law studies despite the significant differences between any
comparative object and Jewish law). The sentiment here is somewhat similar to
that expressed in Bruce S. Ledewitz & Scott Staples, Reflections on the Talmudic
and American Death Penalty, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 37-38 (1993):
[S]imply incorporating Talmudic practice in the American legal system
would not be coherent or possible. Nor would it make sense to grant
normative supremacy to the Talmud, per se. The two systems are
different; the two societies are different.
So, why compare them? The Talmud is a legal system that aspired to
reflect God’s purpose in the world. If such a system could confidently put
men and women to death, then perhaps so can we. If, on the other hand,
the rabbis of the Talmud agonized over execution, limited its reach, and
sought to excuse where possible, perhaps we need to imitate their voices.
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Second, Jewish tradition posits that interpretation of this
autonomous-text Torah-constitution is a dialectic interaction
between the text and interpreter, a process that is unique for
each reader each time the Torah is read. Third, because
interpretation of the autonomous-text Torah-constitution is
a dialectic process unique to each reader, Jewish tradition
maintains that constitutional meaning is pluralistic; the
Torah’s text lends itself to many understandings, and no one
interpretation is inherently superior to any other or can
claim a monopoly on textual truth.
In Jewish tradition, though the Torah-constitution was
promulgated by God, once enacted into law at Mount Sinai,
the Torah became an autonomous text disconnected from the
intentions and understandings of its author, and
transcendent of any formalistic or subjective constructions.
The Torah itself indicates its autonomy from Divine
intentions when it says, “for this law is not hidden from you,
nor is it far away. It is not in heaven . . . it is very close to
you; it is in your mouth and in your heart so that you can
follow it.”164 In several passages, the Talmud explains this
statement, “[i]t is not in heaven,” as indicating that once
given at Mount Sinai the meaning of the Torah was released
from the intentions and understandings of its Divine author,
and was instead handed to the Jewish people to construe in
accordance with their own understandings.165 In what is
perhaps the most oft-quoted Talmudic passage in legal
academic literature, the Talmud demonstrates that God has
no control over how the Torah is properly understood, and
that indeed, human interpreters should disregard
indications of Divine intent.
Rabbi Eliezer used all the arguments in the world [to support
his legal opinion], but they [the majority of the rabbis] did not
accept his view. He said to them, “if the law is like me, let this carob
tree prove it.” The carob tree then uprooted itself and moved one
hundred cubits, and some say, four hundred cubits. The rabbis
replied to him, “one does not bring legal proofs from a carob tree.”
Rabbi Eliezer then said, “if the law is like me, let this stream of
water prove it.” The stream then changed course and began
running upriver. The rabbis replied, “we do not bring legal proofs
164. Deuteronomy 30:11-14.
165. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Mezi’a 59b; BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Hagigah 3b; TOSEFTA, Sotah 7:12.
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from streams of water.” Rabbi Eliezer then said, “if the law is like
me, let the walls of the study hall prove it.” The walls of the study
hall then leaned inward as if to fall down. Rabbi Yehoshua said to
them [the walls], “if Torah scholars debate over the law, what
business is it of your[’s]?” The walls did not fall, but out of respect
for Rabbi Eliezer and his legal position they did not right
themselves either. Rabbi Eliezer then said to the rabbis, “if the law
is like me, let Heaven itself prove it!” A voice then emanated from
the heavens and said, “why do you disagree with Rabbi Eliezer, for
the law is always in accordance with his view.” Rabbi Yehoshua
rose to his feet and responded, “the Torah is ‘not in Heaven.’” What
does it mean that the Torah is “not in Heaven”? Rabbi Yirmiyah
explained, “it means that the Torah was already given to Man at
Mount Sinai, and we therefore do not pay any mind to legal
interpretations offered by a heavenly voice, for God already wrote
in the Torah itself, ‘follow the majority view.’”166

This narrative demonstrates that halakhic authorities
were averse to considering the God’s authorial intentions or
understandings of the Torah when interpreting and applying
the law; once enacted, the Torah-constitution became
autonomous and its meaning was left to be determined by
human interpreters.167 Thus,
the [Halakhah] was entrusted to the halakhic authorities, and the
Giver of the Torah Himself, as it were, accepts their decision. It
would be difficult to picture a more telling illustration of the
exclusive prerogative of the halakhic authorities to declare the law
and of the absolute rule of law, even, as it were, over the divine
Legislator Himself.168

The Talmud reports that following the recorded incident,
Rabbi Natan met the Prophet Elijah and asked him how God
responded to the exchange between Rabbi Yehoshua and his
disputants.169 Elijah responded, “[when the rabbis rejected
the heavenly voice] God was laughing and saying, ‘My
166. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Mezi’a 59b.
167. See R. NISSIM GERONDI, DERASHOT HA-RAN NO. 7; see also R. ARYEH LEIB
HELLER, Introduction to KEZOT HA-HOSHEN (elaborating on Gerondi’s discussion
and observing that once given to the Jews, the Torah is properly interpreted
according to human logic, and therefore many understandings of the Torah can
be “true” since many competing textual meanings can concurrently accord with
human reasoning).
168. ELON, supra note 112, at 262-63 (footnote omitted).
169. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Mezi’a 59b.
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children have bested me, my children have bested me.’”170
This postscript to the Talmudic narrative indicates that God,
too, desires this autonomous-text conception of His law.
“God’s ‘defeat’ signifies a divine form of self-limitation that
allows the human partners to the [Torah-constitution]
covenant to assume responsibility for developing the content
of revelation.”171
In another passage, the Talmud records an incident
involving Rabba bar Nahmeini who fled to the swamps to
avoid persecution by Roman authorities.172 While he was
hiding, the Talmud says, a dispute regarding a point of ritual
purity law was taking place in heaven. God maintained that
in the case under discussion the subject was ritually pure,
while the rest of the heavenly assembly contended that it was
impure.173 All agreed to consult Rabba bar Nahmeini who was
considered the preeminent expert in this field.174 Ultimately,
immediately prior to his death Rabba bar Nahmeini ruled,
like God had argued, that the subject of the debate was
indeed ritually pure.175 Only then, following Rabbah’s
decision, did the celestial disputants accede to God’s view
that the matter was indeed ritually pure.176 Like the earlier
account, this second story attests to the autonomous-text
characterization of the Torah-constitution in Jewish legal
tradition; the text is redeemed from the intentions of its
Author, and those intentions are vindicated only when
confirmed by human authorities.177 But this line of thought
does not end with Talmudic account of the heavenly
170. Id.
171. 1 THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION 265 (Michael Walzer et al. eds., 2000).
172. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Mezi’a 86a.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See R. JUDAH MINZ, RESPONSA MAHARAM MINZ § 100 (explaining that God
and the heavenly assembly were not disputing God’s actual intent when He wrote
the Torah, for God would certainly have ultimate authority as to His own
subjective intentions; rather, they were contending over the present meaning of
the relevant verses in the Torah over which God does not have an interpretive
monopoly).
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academy’s
deferring
to
Rabbah
bar
Nahmeini’s
interpretation of the law. Maimonides in his monumental
halakhic code, Mishneh Torah,178 rules contrary to Rabba bar
Nahmeini’s view.179 One of Maimonides’ chief commentators
explained that since Rabba issued his ruling on this matter
while on his death bed, the decision issued from someone
more in the next world than this one; the dictum of “it is not
in heaven” therefore applies, and the ruling, though
confirmed by God and the heavenly assembly, is rejected.180
Ultimately, constitutional meaning is not synonymous with
God’s authorial intent, but is instead a product of the present
reader’s human understanding.
To say that the meaning of the Torah is entrusted to
human interpreters is a license-grant for every individual to
pragmatically impose their own views on the Torah’s text.
The Talmud teaches that “the Torah is only sustained
through those who destroy [literally “kill”] themselves on its
account.”181 Many commentators take this teaching as a call
to aestheticism, an instruction that only those who eschew
material pleasures can expect to master Torah study.182 The
passage can be taken in another, more metaphysical sense,
however. The Talmud is also teaching that one can only come
to understand the Torah if in the process he “destroys” his
subjectivity and allows the Torah to speak to him before he
analyzes and interprets it through the lens of his own mind.
Thus, immediately after teaching that one must destroy
himself in order to truly understand the Torah, the Talmud
178. The Mishneh Torah, also referred to as Yad ha-Hazakah, is a codification
of Jewish law written by Maimonides (1204) at the end of the twelfth century. See
3 ELON, supra note 112, at 1187-88, 1188 n.22. In Maimonides’ words, the work,
a labor of ten years was prepared as “a compendium of the entire Oral Law,
including the enactments, customs, and decrees instituted from the days of
Moses, our teacher, until the redaction of the Talmud, as expounded for us by the
geonim in all the works composed by them since the completion of the Talmud.”
Id. at 1184-86 (discussing Maimonides’ objectives in writing Mishneh Torah).
179. See MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, The Laws of Tzara’at, ch. 2:9.
180. See R. JOSEPH CARO, KESEF MISHNEH, The Laws of Tzara’at, ch. 2:9 (Baheret
be-Hazi Gris).
181. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot 63b.
182. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, The Laws of Torah Study, ch. 3:12.
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expounds the verse, “Be silent and listen, Israel,”183 to mean
“a person should always first learn Torah and only
afterwards interpret it.”184 Like Gadamer’s philosophical
hermeneutics, then, Jewish tradition instructs that
interpretation is not the imposition of meaning on the text by
the interpreter.185 Instead, the interpreter must leave himself
open, indeed must subjugate his own prior notions and
preconceptions, to what the Torah itself has to tell him before
he can begin to expound and truly understand the text.
There is an important jurisprudential reason for why in
Jewish tradition the interpretation of the Torah and the
development of textual meaning is ultimately left to human
readers and not to God, for why the Torah’s text is considered
essentially autonomous. The underlying aim of Jewish law is
to enable its adherents to morally ennoble themselves
through their choosing to abide by God’s commandments.186
Morality cannot be legislated, however.187 If the Torah was a
clear and comprehensive code of conduct whose application
did not require interpretation (assuming such a thing is even
possible),188 adherence to its dictates would be a purely
mechanical performance of no more moral quality than a
183. Deuteronomy 27:10.
184. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot 63b.
185. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
186. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute
Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 1,
17 (1989) (“[The Jewish legal system] is based on the value of encouraging
individuals to expand their narrow self-centeredness and reach out to a level of
consideration for others: self-transcendence as a key form of moral education.”).
See generally Shlomo Pill, Recovering Judicial Integrity: Towards a Duty-Focused
Disqualification Jurisprudence Based on Jewish Law, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 511,
530-37 (2011).
187. See generally Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and
Limits, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 24, 43-47 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum
eds., 2008) (arguing that moral goods often cannot be realized through legal
compulsion, and that to facilitate individual moral integrity the law must
sometimes decline to regulate so as to enable individuals to make themselves
moral).
188. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 56 (1964) (“No system of law—
whether it be judge-made or legislatively enacted—can be so perfectly drafted as
to leave no room for dispute.”).
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robot’s following its programming. As an autonomous text
that invites and demands human interaction, however, the
Torah induces its adherents to participate in a “continuing
revelation.”189 As an autonomous text, then, the Torah invites
its adherents to become “partners with God in the work of
creation,”190 elevating their law-abiding conduct from slavish
conformity to an external standard to a morally ennobling
collaborative attempt to live justly and righteously within the
bounds set by the Torah-constitution’s text.191
As an autonomous text, the Torah-constitution is held by
Jewish tradition to be interpreted by each reader through a
dialectical interaction between the interpreter’s unique
subjective self and the text. Jewish scholars have often
expressed this idea by intimating that just as every Jewish
soul is unique, so too every Jew has a unique “portion” in the
Torah.192 On this view, the autonomous text of the Torah
lends itself to many, many different explanations, each
189. See Jeffrey I. Roth, The Justification for Controversy under Jewish Law,
76 CALIF. L. REV. 337, 373 (1988).
190. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 10a.
191. See R. SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH,
Deuteronomy 1:17 (Ki Hamishpat le-Elokim Hu) (“In giving judgment [the judge]
is engaged in God’s work. . . . [The Torah’s] [j]ustice shapes a humane way of life
and gives it the form intended by the Creator at the Creation; for the whole
purpose of man’s creation was so that he should freely realize God’s Will, and only
for this purpose did the Creator place man in His world.”).
192. See, e.g., 1 HANINAH BEN-MENAHEM ET AL., DIALOGUE AND CONTROVERSY IN
HALAKHIC SOURCES 100 (1991) (quoting Derekh Eiz Haim):
There are many faces to the Torah . . . for every Jewish soul has its own
portion in the Torah such that there are six-hundred thousand
interpretations for every aspect of the Torah corresponding to the sixhundred thousand souls divided among the Jewish people. This is what
is meant when we say that the flame of the Torah is comprised of many
sparks: Initially, the Torah appears like a single flame, but eventually
one can discern the different kinds of light within the flame, each of
which was revealed in six-hundred thousand ways to the six-hundred
thousand Jewish souls.
Id.; see also id. at 99 (quoting Introduction to BAALEI BRIS AVRAHAM) (“The Torah
is root of every soul, thus [just as there are six-hundred thousand souls]
corresponding to them there are six-hundred thousand understandings such that
each interpretation of the Torah is the essence of a single Jewish soul. And in a
time to come, every person will be able to read and understand the whole Torah
in accordance with the interpretation linked to his soul.”).

392

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

unique interpretation corresponding to a unique individual’s
understanding of the text. Indeed, it is said that competing
understandings of the Torah are “created” by each
individual’s unique “soul”—the essence of their character,
intelligence, and way of thinking.193 Thus, one eighteenth
century rabbi wrote:
The Torah has already been bequeathed to us, and it is in our hands
to understand it in accordance with our own mental abilities and
disposition. . . . Every man understands the meaning of the holy
Torah in accordance with his own disposition. If he is disposed
towards kindness and charity, then he may find everything to be
pure, permissible, and kosher in accordance with his mind’s
understanding of the Torah . . . if he his disposed toward severity,
the opposite will be true.194

Another prominent Talmudist explained that “everyone’s
soul was present at Mount Sinai and received the
Torah . . . . Each perceived the Torah from his own
perspective in accordance with his intellectual capacity as
well as the unique character of his particular soul.”195
A similar idea is offered by Rabbi Solomon B. Isaac
(Rashi), a medieval French Talmudist and the author of the
foremost commentary on the Talmud.196 According to Rashi,
“when two scholars disagree about how to understand the
law, each one saying ‘thus does the law reasonably seem to
me,’” neither disputant is wrong, and neither one is right. 197
“Each is offering his own reasoning,” in accordance with how
the matter appears in his own mind; “one of them gives
reasons to prohibit, and the other gives reasons to permit,”
each analogizing and reasoning based on his own

193. See Introduction to BALEI BRIT AVRAHAM quoted in BEN-MENAHEM ET AL.,
supra note 192 (explaining that every individual has the potential to understand
the Torah in a completely unique way based on a textual meaning he creates
through his unique soul-connected being).
194. R. LEVI YITZCHAK, KEDUSHAT LEVI, Lekutim (Teiku); see also R. MEIR B.
EZEKIEL IBN GABBAI, AVODAT HA-KODESH 169-71 (1901).
195. LURIA, Introduction to Bava Kamma, supra note 156.
196. See RASHI, Ketubot 57a (Ha Kamashma Lan).
197. Id.
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understanding.198 Rashi concludes by saying that with
respect to such disputes we say “these and those [i.e., the
decisions reached by each interpreter] are all the words of the
living God”; both understandings are fundamentally
legitimate.199 Though different, each conclusion is the product
of each interpreter’s unique understanding of the text, a
product of each one’s unique self, and therefore both views
are valid interpretations of the text—the living word of God.
As Jeffrey Roth puts it: “Each . . . sage, depending on his or
her unique perspective, receives an individual portion [in the
Torah].”200
This conception of Torah-constitutional interpretation as
a highly individualized process, a process that cannot
produce the same epistemological results for different
interpreters, is reinforced by Jewish law’s approach to the
authority of precedent. In Jewish law the concept of binding
precedent as we know it in the Anglo-American system is
virtually nonexistent.201 While good halakhic decisors are
expected to give great respect to the scholars that preceded
them, and accord earlier authorities’ rulings great
deference,202 in Jewish law precedent is always only

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Roth, supra note 189, at 373.
201. See Levine, supra note 114, at 476 (“In actual interpretation of the law,
however, just as the search for truth ideally does not respect a specific interpreter
as inherently authoritative, there should be no reliance on precedent in trying to
arrive at the truth.”). See generally Zerach Warhaftig, Precedent in Jewish Law,
in 6-7 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI 105 (1979–1980).
202. See Levine, supra note 114, at 476.
Authorities in Jewish law, however, observed that in the
Talmud, legal authorities who lived after the compilation of the
Mishna did not dispute the rulings of those who lived before
them. According to the principle articulated by Maimonides, the
later authorities should have had discretion to offer their own
views on matters of legal interpretation. Apparently, although
not strictly bound by precedent, the later authorities
nevertheless accepted as binding upon themselves the decisions
of the earlier authorities.
Id. (citation omitted).
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persuasive; it is never truly binding.203 Thus, the Talmud
teaches that the mediocre leader Jephtah, in his generation,
is considered as authoritative as the great and preeminent
prophet Samuel was in his generation;204 the great scholars
of each era must interpret the Torah as they understand it,
not as previous—even greater—decisors have done in the
past.205 The reason for this lies in the notion of a unique
dialectic interpretive experience, which features prominently
in Jewish legal thought. Every interpreter understands the
Torah’s text in his own way; for him, that understanding is
the true meaning of the text, and he must abide by it.206 Thus,
in Jewish law, a cardinal principle of judicial practice is “a
judge has nothing upon which to base a decision except what
203. See TOSEFOT SANS, Ediyot 1:4 (“Although a minority opinion may not be
accepted when initially proposed [and may be overruled by a majority of judges
who disagree with that interpretation of the law], if a majority of the scholars of
the next generation agree to the rationale underlying the previously rejected
interpretation, that view can be established as normative law.”).
204. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Rosh Hashanah 25b.
205. See R. ASHER B. JEHIEL, Responsa Rosh 55:9.
That which you wrote that the elder, the great scholar, R. Isaac b.
Shoshan is imbued with these [judicial] characteristics, and that
therefore who can think in his heart to disagree with him; this is not a
proof. Indeed, who is greater than Rashi, who enlightened the eyes of all
the Diaspora with his [Talmudic and Bibilical] commentaries, and yet in
many places his own grandchildren, Rabbeinu Tam and Rabbbenu Isaac,
argue with him and refute his views. The Torah is about truth, and we
cannot flatter any man [by uncritically accepting his view]. . . . And the
Geonim have already decided that from the time of the [Talmudic sages]
Abaya and Rava and onward, the law is in accordance with the views of
the latter authority.
Id.; see also R. ASHER B. JEHIEL, ROSH, Sanhedrin 4:6.
206. See Introduction to 1 RESPONSA IGROT MOSHE, Orah Hayyim:
There is certainly reason to suppose that when making a legal decision
we have note fully understood the truth of the law as it is known to God.
But with respect to the search for truth in legal decision-making it
already says, “it is not in heaven.” Rather, the practical legal truth is as
the law appears to the scholar after he has adequately considered the
matter in attempting to trace the law through the Talmud and later
decisors – this is the truth [for him] and so he must rule.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Ben-Menahem, supra note 160 (correlating the
religious character of Jewish law with legal decisors’ prerogative to creatively
interpret the law based on the circumstances presented in individual cases).
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his eyes see.”207 An interpreter must follow his
interpretation—what his eyes see—and not what some other
interpreter, even a seemingly more erudite reader,
understands the Torah’s text to mean.208
Just as the interpretive experience of every interpreter is
unique on account of each reader’s singular soul-being, every
interpretive experience is also unique because, as Gadamer
recognized, the interpreter’s experiential horizon changes in
between each reading. In Moses’ final speech to the Jewish
people immediately before they entered Canaan he said,
“Hearken and listen, Israel; on this very day you have become
a nation.”209 Recognizing that the Jewish people became a
nation at Mount Sinai, forty years before Moses’ farewell
address, the Talmud asks, “But was it really on that day that
they became a nation? Wasn’t this day at the close of the forty
years spent in the desert?”210 In a powerful statement of the
uniqueness of every interpretive experience, the Talmud
answers that “this verse is teaching us that each and every
day the Torah should be as dear to the reader as the day it
was first given at Mount Sinai.”211 In similar vein, another
Talmudic passage analogizes the Torah to a fig tree: “In the
case of a fig tree, every time a person approaches it and
handles it he finds a few new ripe figs; so too with the
Torah—each time one studies it he finds new meaning in its
words.”212
Because Jewish tradition posits that the Torah is an
autonomous text not bound to any particular conception of its
meaning, and because Jewish thought further understands
the interpretive process as a case-specific interaction
between a unique interpretive personality and the Torah’s
text, Jewish law jurisprudence also maintains that
207. See II Chronicles 19:6 (emphasis added); see also CARO, supra note 114,
Hoshen Mishpat 8:2.
208. See R. MOSES FEINSTEIN, III IGROT MOSHE, Yoreh De’ah § 88 (citing
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Batra 88a); Levine, supra note 114, at 477.
209. Deuteronomy 27:9.
210. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Brachot 63b.
211. Id.
212. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Eruvin 54a-b.
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interpretive meaning is fundamentally pluralistic. The
Talmud observes that “just as the face of every person is
different, so too is the mind of every person unique.”213
Consequently, “there are seventy faces to the Torah”214—
there are as many ways to understand the Torah as there are
different minds and ways of thinking among mankind—and
therefore “a single [scriptural] verse can lend itself to
multiple interpretations.”215
No single interpretation or understanding of the Torah is
absolutely correct; there are many ways of understanding the
Torah’s text, and each construction has a valid claim on the
truth. “The word of God admits of many meanings, so you
must not say ‘God said this intending that particular
interpretation.’”216 Thus, in commentating on the deepseated, long-standing halachic disputations between the
Schools of Hillel and Shammai217 the Talmud relates that,
“these and those are the words of the living God.”218 Making
a similar point in another passage, the Talmud explains the
scriptural analogy between the Torah and a “hammer
striking a stone and causing sparks”219: “Just as the hammer
blow devolves into many sparks, so too the text of the Torah
devolves into multiple explanations.”220 Interpretive textual
truth is thus an elusive concept; even if it does exist in some
metaphysical sense, as a practical matter there is no single
textual truth, only multiple truths with inherently equal

213. MIDRASH RABBAH, Numbers 21; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot
58a.
214. MIDRASH RABBAH, Numbers 47:2; see also
Shabbat 86a; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 34a.

BABYLONIAN TALMUD,

215. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 34a.
216. BEN-MENAHEM ET AL., supra note 192, at 98 (quoting Introduction to Baalei
Brit Avraham).
217. On the disputes between these two jurisprudential schools, see 3 ELON,
supra note 112, at 1064-66.
218. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Eruvin 13b.
219. Jeremiah 23:29.
220. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 88b.
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claims to possessing an accurate account of what the Torah
means.221
The Jewish legal tradition reinforces this interpretive
pluralism by emphasizing that despite the great diversity of
interpretations, all of these understandings stem from the
same source—the God-given autonomous text of the Torah—
and all are therefore inherently valid. Explaining the notion
that contradictory understandings of the Torah can both be
“the words of the living God,” Rabbi Yom Tov b. Abraham
Ishbili (Ritba), a thirteenth century Spanish Talmudist and
legal decisor, writes that “when Moses ascended on high to
receive the Torah, for every point of law God showed him
forty-nine ‘faces’ to prohibit and forty-nine ‘faces’ to
permit.”222 In other words, the giving of the Torah itself
involved God’s revealing the potential diversity of
221. Rabbi Moses Feinstein understood that halakhic truth does exist in a
metaphysical sense; God Himself knows what the law really means. Nevertheless,
human beings can never replicate that perfect legal knowledge, and even if they
could they would be unable to prove the fact. In the realm of practical legal
practice, then, we attempt to approximate the Torah’s absolute truths, and in
doing so no one approximation has an exclusive claim on correct textual
understanding. See generally Feinstein, supra note 206. Other sources indicate,
however, that there is no transcendental textual truth, even from God’s
omniscient vantage. Instead, textual truth is created by every interpreter.
Illustrating this idea, the Talmud constructs a conversation between Moses and
God. “Moses said before God: ‘Master of the World, teach me, what is the law?’
God answered him: ‘“Follow the majority’; if the majority exonerates, the law is
that the defendant is exonerated, if the majority holds him liable, the law is that
he is liable.” JERUSALEM TALMUD, Sanhedrin 4:2.
222. R. OM TOV B. ABRAHAM ISHBILI, NOVELLAE RITBA, Eruvin 13b (Eilu V’eilu);
see also MISHNAH, Soferim 17:6 (“Rabbi Yanai said, ‘The Torah that God gave to
Moses was given with forty-nine “faces” supporting a ruling that a thing is impure
and forty-nine “faces” supporting a ruling that the thing is pure.’”); 1 THE
MIDRASH ON PSALMS, Psalms 12:4 (Leon Nemoy et al. eds., William G. Braude
trans., 1959):
Rabbi Yannai said: The words of the Torah were not given as clear cut
decisions. Rather, with every word the Holy One, Blessed be He, spoke
to Moses, He gave him forty-nine arguments whereby a thing might be
found pure and forty-nine arguments whereby it might be found impure.
When Moses asked God, “Master of the Universe, if so how shall we know
the law,” God answered him, “Follow the majority”; when the majority
rule it pure, it is pure, and when the majority rule it impure, it is impure.
THE MIDRASH ON PSALMS, supra.
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understandings. “Everything that any student of the Torah
would ever offer in explanation of the text was foretold to
Moses at Sinai.”223 Because they are all fairly encompassed in
the text of the Torah understood through the varying
subjective lenses of every interpreter, multiple contradictory
interpretations of the Torah can all lay claim to the truth; all
were part of God’s revelation of the law at Mount Sinai, no
less so than the text itself. “A man might say to himself, since
these decisors prohibit and these permit, for what purpose do
I study?” To correct this misconception, the passage points
out, the Torah has taught “they were given by a single
shepherd; one shepherd bequeathed them, one God created
them. Thus you must make your heart like a multi-roomed
chamber in order to store in it the words of those that prohibit
and of those that permit.”224
C. Interpretation, Debate, and Resolution in Jewish Legal
Theory and Practice
Jewish law constitutionalism maintains a pluralistic
autonomous-text interpretive tradition.225 This expansive
conception of textual understanding only holds true in a
theoretical sense, however. In practice, every legal question
must be decided one way or the other; a pluralistic sense of
text and truth cannot devolve into a state of interpretive
anarchy, every individual—qualified legal scholar and
layman alike—acting in accordance with their own

223. BAYLONIAN TALMUD, Megilah 19b.
224. THE TOSEFTA, Sota 7:12 (Jacob Neusner trans., 1979) (quoting Ecclesiastes
12:11); see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Hagigah 3b (“Perhaps a man will say, ‘how
can I ever learn the Torah?’ Therefore it says, ‘all of them were given by one
shepherd’: one God gave them; one Provider said them, from the mouth of the
Ruler of All Things Blessed be He, as it says, ‘and God spoke all of these things.’”);
MIDRASH RABAH, Numbers 15:22 (“Lest you say, ‘this one permits and that one
prohibits; this one validates and this one invalidates; this one says pure and that
one says impure; Rabbi Eliezer holds liable and Rabbi Yehoshua exonerates; Bet
Shammai invalidates and Bet Hillel validates. To whom then should we listen?’
God therefore instructs that despite the disagreement all of these views were
given by one shepherd.”).
225. See supra Part II.B.
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understanding of the Torah.226 The Torah itself thus
instructs, “do not cut yourselves,”227 which the Midrash
explains as cautioning, “do not divide yourselves into
different groups; rather you should all be a single unit acting
in concert.”228 Elaborating on this concept, R. Menachem b.
Shlomo Meiri writes that this verse instructs that “this group
should not act in this way [i.e., following one interpretation
of the Torah] while this other group acts a different way such
that it appears that they are following two separate
Torahs.”229 Thus, while there is a multiplicity of legitimate
interpretations of the Torah, and every reader’s
understanding has inherent truth-value, in practice only one
opinion can prevail at any given time among a particular
constituency or in a particular jurisdiction.230
To uphold the requirement that in practice “the Torah
must not appear to be two Torahs” in the face of an
autonomous-text interpretive tradition that prides itself on
the pluralism of textual understanding, Jewish legal
226. See 3 ELON, supra note 112, at 1067 (“[W]hile it was thus unequivocally
determined that the Halakhah could not tolerate pluralism in practice, the
important principle was also established that in the realm of ideas, for the
purpose of debate and study, ‘the words of both are the words of the living God.’”);
Levine, supra note 114, at 472.
227. Deuteronomy 14:1.
228. SIFRE, A TANNAITIC COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF DEUTERONOMY, Parshat
Re’eh § 96.
229. R. MENACHEM B. SHLOMO MEIRI, BEIT HA-BEHHIRAH, Yevamot 14a (Zu).
230. See Sefer Hahinukh § 467.
This proscription [on competing legal practices] applies only
within a single group, such that the members of the group divide
themselves [some following one interpretation in practice and
others following a different textual understanding] . . . In such
a case they must debate and deliberate until they can all agree
to implement one interpretation in practice. . . . But when two
duly constituted courts disagree about how to apply the law to a
particular case . . . we do not say ‘do not divide
yourselves’[; rather, each jurisdiction follows the rulings of its
own court].
Id.; MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, The Laws of Idolatry, ch. 12:14 (“And included
in this prohibition is a rule that there should not be two courts in the same city,
each one following and ruling in accordance with its own interpretation of the
law.”) (emphasis added).
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tradition takes a process and institution-oriented approach
to resolving legal questions.231 The Torah instructs that in
legal matters the law “follows the majority.”232 For purposes
of legal practice, in other words, interpretive indeterminacy
is resolved by following the understanding maintained by a
majority of the members of the decisional body regarded as
authoritative within a particular jurisdiction or by a
particular constituency. The Torah itself provides for this
institution-oriented system of interpretive authority as
follows: “[w]henever there is a legal matter that you are
unable to resolve . . . you shall approach . . . the judge who
will be in those days and inquire of him, and he will tell you
what the law is. And you shall act in accordance with what
he tells you.”233 Nachmanides explains:
The Torah was given to us by Moses our teacher in writing, and it
is apparent that there will never be complete agreement about how
to understand or apply it in new cases. Therefore, God decreed that
we should obey the High Court in all its pronouncements; whether
the judges received their interpretive understanding from tradition
or reached their conclusions on the basis of their own
understanding of what the Torah means. 234

In other words, in hard cases, where reasonable people
disagree about how to act under the law based on their
disparate interpretations of the Torah, the question of how to
act in practice shall be resolved by the presiding judicial
authority.235
While a presiding institutional interpretive authority’s
judicial ruling is considered binding,236 its interpretive
understanding is not conclusive in a metaphysical sense. An
authoritative court’s interpretation of the Torah does not
establish what the autonomous text of the Torah actually
231. See RAMBAN NACHMANIDES, supra note 148, Deuteronomy 17:11.
232. Exodus 23:2.
233. Deuteronomy 17:8-10.
234. NACHMANIDES, COMMENTARY ON MAIMONIDES’ SEFER HA-MITZVOT § 1.
235. See MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, The Laws of Apostates, ch. 2:1-2.
236. See Deuteronomy 17:11 (“[A]ccoridng to the law as they tell it to you shall
you act; do not veer from it whether to the left or right.”); BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Sanhedrin 88b.
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means—as we have seen, the text means many things and no
one particular thing.237 The institutional decision merely
establishes the current standard of practice under the law.
Alternative understandings of the Torah, however, are
preserved as legitimate interpretations of the law,238 and may
be adopted by other courts with interpretive authority over a
particular jurisdiction or constituency.239
Thus, in the Jewish constitutional tradition, there is a
plurality of legitimate interpretations of the Torah; indeed,
every person can and should understand the Torah
somewhat differently. Only one interpretation can be
implemented in practice, however, and the task of mediating
between competing understandings of what the Torah means
is an institutional one. Jewish law prescribes that the
accepted judicial authority of every jurisdiction and
constituency should decide what the Torah requires in
practice at any given time. This institutional statement of
237. See supra notes 226-27.
238. See R. JUDAH LOEW, DEREKH HAYYIM, Avot 5:17 (“Even though in practice
it is inconceivable for a person to act one way while [authoritative decisors] have
ruled to the contrary . . . nevertheless, both views are from the Holy One, Blessed
be He, who encompasses all contrary interpretations.”); RASHI, Ketubot 57a (Ha
Kamashma Lan) (“When two scholars argue over how to understand the
law . . . we say ‘these and those are both the words of the living God.’ Sometimes
this one’s reasoning is more compelling, but at other times the other one’s
reasoning is more compelling.”); R. JOSEPH HAHN, Responsa Yosef Omez § 51
(“Why do we record the interpretations of the Students of Shammai and of other
minority views that have been rejected in practice? Because even understandings
of the Torah that are rejected in practice are nevertheless considered words of
Torah, for we say ‘these and those are the words of the living God.’”).
239. See MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, The Laws of Apostates, ch. 2:1:
The Great Court interprets the text of the Torah in accordance with what
appears correct in their eyes, and rules accordingly. But another court
can rise up after them, and they may see an alternative understanding
that compels them to reject the earlier court’s interpretation. If so, they
must overrule the previous court and decide the case in accordance with
what they understand the Torah to mean, for it says, “[Go to the judge]
that will be in those days”; you are only obligated to follow the
interpretation of the judges of your generation.
Id.; see also 1 R. MOSES B. JOSEPH TRANI, Responsa Mabit § 21 (explaining that
institutional authority to conclusively resolve questions of legal practice rests in
the established court of each community such that the prohibition of “do not
divide yourselves into groups” applies only among the members of a community,
but does not demand a uniformity of practice between distinct communities).

402

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

textual meaning is authoritative not because it is objectively
correct—indeed it is not and may be replaced by an
alternative reading of the Torah by subsequent judges sitting
on the same bench—but because the Torah-constitution gave
the courts the power to determine which interpretation of the
Torah should prevail in practice.
III. AUTONOMOUS-TEXT CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN
AMERICAN CONTEXT: PERVASIVE QUESTIONS AND SOME
TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS
Three principle concerns drive much of the interpretive
orthodoxy. The principle justifications and criticisms of
textualism, historicism, and pragmatism indicate that these
interpretive theories are driven by the relative value they
place on the dead hand problem, the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, and the need to constrain judicial decision-making.
This Part tentatively considers how an autonomous-text
model of constitutional interpretation driven by the Jewish
law constitutional tradition might deconstruct these
concerns, making it a prescriptively appealing alternative to
the currently prevailing interpretive methodologies.
Part
III.A
discusses
how
autonomous-text
constitutionalism might address one of the pervasive
concerns of democratic constitutional theory—that of
contemporary majorities being constrained by the dead hand
of the past. Part III.B explores how a Jewish law-inspired
autonomous-text constitutionalism might deconstruct the
problem associated with unelected judges having final
interpretive authority over a super-majoritarian constitution
in a fundamentally democratic society. Finally, Part III.C
considers how Jewish law constitutionalism deals with the
competing needs for pragmatic interpretation and the
maintenance of constitutional tradition and continuity.
A. Democracy and the Dead Hand Problem
America’s dual commitment to republicanism and
majoritarian politics on the one hand, and to fixed
constitutionalism as a trump on majority preferences on the
other, challenge the democratic legitimacy of the
Constitution and its capacity to bind contemporary
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majorities.240 Pragmatists and textualists have often
criticized historical interpretation on the ground that the
democratic legitimacy of the Constitution rests in its
acceptance by contemporary majorities, not in its long-ago
ratification by a (white male) People terribly out of touch with
today’s world.241 Non-historicists argue therefore that the
Constitution cannot simply mean what its original ratifiers
understood or intended it to; it must be interpreted as
embodying “modern, rather than anachronistic, values.”242
The Jewish constitutional tradition is not bothered by
the dead hand problem, however. Although Jews’ binding
obligation to abide by the Torah-constitution rests on a
consent-theory,243 Jewish law finds no contradiction between
the legitimizing consent of contemporary Jews in all corners
of the globe and their duty to abide by a fundamental law
accepted by a collection of recently freed slaves at a mountain
in the Sinai desert 3000 years ago. Jewish law’s autonomoustext tradition teaches that every individual one of the “six240. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?,
107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 192 (2008) (“[G]overning the population of the United
States today according to the constitutional understandings of people long since
dead should not be understood as showing respect for democratic-enactment
authority.”).
241. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 28, at 438 (“What the constitutional
fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the
vision of our time . . . . Our Constitution was not intended to preserve a
preexisting society but to make a new one . . . .”); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual
Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358-60
(2007) (“[Non-originalists] are plagued by anxiety about the dead hand of the
past—and think we need to update and affirm the document’s underlying
principles if it is to be binding on anyone living today.”).
242. Peter J. Smith, How Different are Originalism and Non-Originalism,
62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 714 (2011).
243. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Seder Moe’d: Shabbat 88a.
Rav Avdimi bar Chama bar Chasa said, “[Prior to the Sinaitic revelation,
God suspended a mountain over them [the Jews], and said to them: ‘If
you accept the Torah, good; but if not this shall be your grave.’” Rav Acha
bar Yaakov responded, “If so, this episode provides a strong basis for
rejecting our obligation to the Torah!” Rava explained, “That is true, but
they [the Jews] subsequently consented to the Torah’s laws without
coercion.”
Id.
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hundred thousand Jewish souls” has a unique “portion” in
the Torah, and can glean a unique textual understanding of
the Torah-constitution’s text.244 Similarly, this tradition
holds that every one of those souls was present at Sinai and
agreed to accept the Torah, thus establishing a basis for the
Torah’s consent-based authority through successive
generations of Jews.245 Whether these teaching are to be
taken literally or not, they admit an important parallel
between the consent-based authority of a law and the
autonomous-text interpretation of that law. Through his
interpretive dialectic with the Torah, every Jew—each one of
six-hundred thousand souls—gains a unique understanding
of the Torah, and because every Jew—in every time and
every place—can and must interpretively engage the law’s
text, the Torah-constitution can claim the authorizing
consent of contemporary adherents as if they themselves
stood at the foot of Mount Sinai.
Similarly, autonomous-text constitutionalism in the
American context has the potential to neutralize the
pervasive dead hand problem. “The Constitution derives its
binding authority—binding on the governed and the
government alike—only from the fact that it is an act of the
people in their constituting capacity.”246 The only way to
justify our super-majoritarian commitment to the
Constitution, then, is “through an ongoing, not a past, act of
constituting.”247 As the Jewish tradition indicates, this
continuous act of constituting might be found in
contemporary interpreters’ dialectic interpretation of the
constitutional text. On this view, current majorities are not
controlled by the dead hand of the past. Instead,
contemporary interpreters understand the Constitution in
their own unique ways, informed by their experience of the
world, and which of these textual meanings controls
constitutional practice at a given time is determined by

244. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
245. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Seder Moe’d: Shabbat 146a.
246. WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 236-37 (1987).
247. GOLDFORD, supra note 25, at 275; see also Eskridge, supra note 66, at
622-23, 633 (discussing how Gadamer’s hermeneutics creates the possibility of
multiple textual meanings).
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institutions—our courts—which we as a society have agreed
are well-suited to choosing among interpretive options.
B. Subjectivity, Constraint, and the Counter-Majoritarian
Difficulty
Another pervasive challenge posed by American
constitutionalism is what Alexander Bickel famously called
the counter-majoritarian difficulty,248 the tension between
the democratic character of American politics and the
authoritative interpretation and application of the
Constitution by unelected, unaccountable judges, and the
related problem of constraining judges’ discretion.
Textualists contend that judicial discretion is cabined and
the counter-majoritarian difficulty largely diffused by
limiting interpreters’ ability to impose their own views on
legal text, instead demanding that textual understandings be
confined to the plain meaning of the law enacted by
democratic legislatures. Historicists make similar claims,
arguing that even if historical interpretation does not
eliminate judicial discretion it at least limits it, and focuses
interpreters’ subjectivity on a narrow set of normatively
legitimate sources of historical textual meaning.249
Pragmatists argue that the counter-majoritarian difficulty is
no real difficulty at all. Unelected judges are in the best
position to reasonably and deliberately consider how the
Constitution’s text should be interpreted in order to best
achieve substantive policy ends;250 while the interpretive
process may not therefore be a democratic one, it principally
promotes the ends of the demos’ desired public policy in ways
that political institutions cannot.251
Jewish law’s autonomous-text constitutional tradition
dismantles the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Jewish
constitutionalism maintains that in principle, textual truth
is pluralistic, and therefore, judicial interpretations and
248. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
249. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 24.
250. See BICKEL, supra note 248, at 24.
251. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-131 (1978).
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applications of the law do not establish what the law means
in an ontological sense.252 Instead, judicial decision-making is
merely an institution-focused means of deciding among
competing legitimate understandings of what the law’s text
means at a particular time and for a particular case.253 While
judges are encouraged to give prior judicial interpretations
by prominent and well-regarded legal authorities due
deference, they are not inextricably bound by precedent;
instead, every judge can and must interpret the text as he
understands it, through the lens of his experiential conscious,
a horizon similar to but nevertheless unique from the general
interpretive tone of the place and time in which he lives.254
An
autonomous-text
model
of
American
constitutionalism might similarly mitigate the countermajoritarian difficulty by rethinking judges’ roles in
constitutional interpretation and adjudication, and the
nature of constitutional textual truth. Taking a cue from the
Jewish tradition, American constitutionalism might begin by
reevaluating the nature of constitutional textual
understanding. Instead of thinking of textual meaning as a
definite thing to be discovered—in the plain meaning of the
text, historical documents, or the empirical furtherance of
substantive policies—constitutional interpretation should be
conceived of as an individualized process that leads to an
internal, organic understanding of the text. Textual
meaning, in other words, should be thought of as pluralistic,
something unique to every interpreter, something to which
no particular interpretation can lay exclusive claim.
On this view, we might begin to consider how difficult the
counter-majoritarian difficulty really is. If textual meaning
is pluralistic, judges don’t (can’t) decide what the
constitutional text means in derogation of the prerogative of
contemporary majorities. Simply put, a society governed by
the rule of law needs some way to decide which
understanding of the text should control in practice, and
society has determined that for a variety of reasons the courts
as an institution, not judges as platonic philosopher-king
252. See supra notes 218-29, 241-44 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
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individuals, are that way. Unelected judges, then, don’t
subvert the demos’ constitutional prerogative. They merely
decide which legitimate understanding of the text should
control in a given case, and because they are unelected and
not politically accountable they can hermeneutically interact
with the interpreted text better than more political
interpreters who are more likely to impose their experiential
horizon on instead of merging it with that of the text.
C. A Constant Star in a Changing World: Constitutional
Fidelity and Real-World Consequences
Finally, American constitutionalism and theories of
constitutional interpretation are concerned with the realworld effects of constitutional adjudication. If it is to be a
constitution, the Constitution must be an enduring
fundamental law that drives the political character of the
United States, not merely a form of legislation albeit of
supreme legal authority. But, if it is to function as such, if it
really is to shape contemporary realities, it must also be
shaped by them; an unbending tree is certain to break in a
strong wind, while even the strongest blows cannot truly
destroy a malleable metal. Pragmatists thus argue that
interpreters ought to understand the text in light of the realworld impact of their understanding measured by valueladen substantive criteria. Often recognizing the inherent
importance of making the Constitution work, textualists and
historicists nevertheless contend that doing so is the province
of the democratic branches of government; the courts should
apply the law as understood through textualist or historicist
interpretive methods, not surreptitiously rewrite the rules in
order to further what they perceive to be important
substantive policy ends. More strident opponents of
pragmatism reject such result-oriented interpretation on
normative grounds; legal texts have meaning, they say, and
the judge’s job is to find and apply that meaning, not to make
up his own.
The autonomous-text constitutional tradition may offer
an approach that recognizes the need to interpret and apply
the Constitution with due regard for the real-world effects of
that construction while still maintaining a strong respect for
continuing a limiting constitutional tradition that proscribes
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some conduct, their desirable impact notwithstanding.
Recognizing the singularity of every interpretive experience,
Jewish constitutionalism maintains that every legal decisor
must apply the Torah-constitution as he understands it, and
not simply as his predecessors construed the text.255 In this
sense, constitutional interpretation in Jewish law is creative
and pragmatic; every interpretion creates new meaning in
the Torah’s text, oftentimes by reading the law through the
lens of his own experience, which includes his impressions of
the practical implications of the case at hand and importance
of meta-principles, the equivalent of pragmatists’
substantive policy goals. In this sense, interpretation in
Jewish law is often casuistic; “there is . . . a tendency in
halakhah to allow its vast store of primary and secondary
principles to be moulded by the facts of the particular case.”256
While legal and constitutional interpretation in Jewish
law is in this sense highly pragmatic, as a religious legal
system, it recognizes the prime imperative to maintain God’s
law rather than create a new regime out of convenience. A
prime value in Jewish legal thinking is the notion that it is
not the Torah that must be molded and reshaped to conform
to the times, but that the times must be made suitable to the
Torah.257 Thus,
[i]n exercising their vast power, the halakhic authorities faced a
dual task. On the one hand, they were constantly concerned about
carrying forward the creativity and development of the Halakhah;
on the other hand, they carried the enormously heavy responsibility
for preserving the spirit and maintaining the direction and
continuity of the Halakhah.258

In reconciling these conflicting pragmatic and traditionmaintaining interpretive imperatives, Jewish law asserts
that, while as a formal matter, judges can and should
interpret and apply the law based on their own
255. See supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
256. DANIEL B. SINCLAIR, JEWISH BIOMEDICAL LAW: LEGAL
DIMENSIONS 7 (2003).

AND

EXTRA-LEGAL

257. See generally R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, Judaism Up To Date, in
2 JUDAISM ETERNAL 213 (Isidore Grunfeld ed., 1956).
258. ELON, supra note 112, at 272.
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understandings of the relevant texts and with an eye towards
the consequences of their decisions; in practice they must
proceed with the greatest caution and deference to
tradition.259 The Talmud indicates the awe in which current
scholars should hold the textual understandings of their
predecessors: “If earlier sages were like the sons of angels, we
are sons of men; and if they were like the sons of men, then
we are like donkeys.”260 For all its potential dynamism and
interpretive creativity, and despite the broad interpretive
freedom held by every Jewish law decisor, interpreters of the
Jewish law constitution are nevertheless constrained by “the
awe with which former generations [are] regarded, the
esteem in which earlier authorities [are] held, and the
concomitant humility felt by later teachers in comparison.”261
Thus, in Jewish constitutionalism, textual pluralism and
interpreters’ duty to apply the law as they understand it
“never led to a chaotic hodge-podge of ad hoc awards or to an
idiosyncratic maze of [subjective] judge-made laws”262 as
historicists and textualists would expect.263 Rabbinic decisors
can and do make pragmatic decisions in individual cases
when extreme circumstances warrant, but they do so with
fear and trepidation, recognizing that in some sense they are
playing fast and loose with God’s own law and with the
constructions given to that law by past generations of
venerated sages who represent a chain of tradition linking
present interpreters to the revelation of the law at Sinai.264
259. See generally Norman Lamm & Aaron Kirschenbaum, Freedom and
Constraint in the Jewish Judicial Process, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (1979).
260. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Seder Moe’d: Shabbat.
261. Lamm & Kirschenbaum, supra note 259, at 129; see also 1 BEN-MENAHEM
supra note 192, at 41-59 (1991) (quoting numerous sources highlighting
the deference owed earlier interpreters and the appropriate trepidation with
which Jewish law interpreters should approach innovative and creative Torah
law construction).
ET AL.,

262. Lamm & Kirschenbaum, supra note 259, at 129.
263. See supra notes 16-18, 27-29 and accompanying text.
264. For a discussion on Jewish law’s tradition of judges’ fear and trepidation in
the face of having to issue practical legal rulings involving fresh legal
interpretations of God’s law, see generally Sinai, supra note 149, at 357. For a
more complete discussion of deference and respect for earlier authorities as a
meaningful constraint on creative Jewish legal interpretation, see Roth, supra
note 149.
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Taking a lesson from Jewish law autonomous-text
constitutionalism, American interpretive theory might
recognize the unavoidability of pragmatic constitutional
construction without also tossing any solid sense judicial
constraint to the wind. Constitutional decision-making is,
always has been, and should be healthily pragmatic in the
sense that interpretation and application of the Constitution
must take into account the consequences of judicial decisions
considered in light of America’s many cherished substantive
values and objectives. But, pragmatism of this sort need not
invariably lead to interpretive anarchy and a judicial
autocracy. Judges should—and largely do—have a healthy
regard for the past. Part of the dialectic interpretive
experience is allowing the text—its language, history,
purpose, development, practical experience—to shape the
reader’s understanding of the law. Doing so requires
American judges, like Jewish law interpreters, to approach
their task with due regard for what the existing
constitutional tradition has to offer; to reject that impression
only when its merging with their own experiential horizon
absolutely demands it; and to do so with the greatest
humility and deference. Judges should recognize that while
autonomous-textualism instructs that their understanding is
just as legitimate as any other, they are attempting to
understand the very fabric of our national being, and that
they must therefore proceed with the greatest caution, never
allowing their personal preferences an undue voice in their
dialectic interpretive conversation with the Constitution’s
text.
CONCLUSION
The
experiential
model
of
autonomous-text
constitutionalism posed by Jewish law offers a hopeful
account of what constitutional discourse might look like. By
positing the possibility and demonstrating the workability of
interpretive pluralism, the autonomous-text tradition frees
debate over how a constitution should be interpreted from the
all-or-nothing overtones of political argument. Jewish law’s
autonomous-text constitutional tradition offers the
possibility of an interpretive approach that is descriptively
accurate and prescriptively compelling. The key question
becomes which one of many interpretively plausible
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understandings should be adopted by those institutions
tasked with mediating these competing interpretive
perspectives, not which interpretation or interpretive theory
is the right one. With the stakes thus significantly lowered,
discussions about constitutional meaning might proceed in a
more reasonable, less caustic manner.
Autonomous-text constitutionalism, to be sure, is not
neat; it creates the possibility—the near certainty—of doubt
about the meaning of our most highly enshrined norms. But
the institutional mediation of competing views of the good
inheres in the very fabric of America’s political-legal culture.
From the perspective of autonomous-textualism, courts’
mediating among litigants competing but legitimate
constitutional understandings does not meaningfully differ
from legislatures’ choosing among contrasting policy
preferences being made by legislatures. In both cases, an
accepted institution decides for purposes of present practice
which conception of the good will prevail, and in neither
instance does the deciding authority claim the ability to
infallibly and finally pronounce transcendental politicallegal truths.
Autonomous-textualism thus hearkens to the very best
of America’s constitutional tradition, a liberal commitment to
political—and interpretive—autonomy, a respect for
everyone’s ability to develop their own conception of the good
life, but also an account of the institutional rule of law.

